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Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in
Consumer Bankruptcy
Rafael I. Pardo*
Abstract
During the three decades following the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, courts and commentators have been vexed by the
problem of determining the present value of future payments to creditors
proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan. The issue central to this
problem has been the discount rate to be applied when conducting
present-value analysis. While the Code unmistakably requires the
discounting of future payments as part of the process for confirming a
repayment plan, the Code does not explicitly specify the rate itself or the
manner in which the rate should be calculated.
No uniform rule of decision has emerged on this issue. Instead, a
multitude of approaches has proliferated within and across circuits.
Not even the Supreme Court has been able to bring uniformity to bear
on the issue. When given the opportunity to do so in 2004, the Court in
1
Till v. SCS Credit Corp. could muster only a plurality opinion. In the
wake of Till, disarray over the discount-rate calculus continues to
abound.
The main goal of this Article is to reconceptualize present-value
analysis in consumer bankruptcy. It argues that, as a positive matter,
the Bankruptcy Code compels use of a discount rate that solely accounts
for expected inflation, but that does not take into account opportunity
cost or the risk of nonpayment. The Article also examines whether the

* Professor of Law, University of Washington. For helpful comments and
suggestions, I am grateful to Robert Ahdieh, Joanna Shepherd Bailey, William Buzbee,
William Carney, David Epstein, David Hoffman, Timothy Holbrook, Michael Kang,
Margaret Lemos, Jonathan Nash, Charles O’Kelley, the Honorable Pamela Pepper,
Lawrence Ponoroff, Frederick Tung, and Kathryn Watts. This Article has also benefited
greatly from the commentary of participants at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Canadian
Law and Economics Association and at faculty workshops at Emory University School of
Law; the University of California, Irvine School of Law; and the University of Washington
School of Law.
1. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
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doctrinal prescription for the application of an inflation discount rate is
normatively desirable. The Article concludes that, not only does an
inflation rate comport with generally held theory of bankruptcy law’s
procedural and substantive goals, it also optimizes the statutory design
of the Bankruptcy Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy
courts.
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I. Introduction
During the three decades following the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code,2 courts and commentators have been vexed by the problem of
determining the present value of future payments to creditors proposed in a
debtor’s repayment plan. The issue central to this problem has been the
discount rate to be applied when conducting present-value analysis. While
the Code unmistakably requires the discounting of future payments as part
of the process for confirming a repayment plan, the Code does not
explicitly specify the rate itself or the manner in which the rate should be
calculated.
No uniform rule of decision has emerged on this issue. Instead, a
multitude of approaches has proliferated within and across circuits.3 The
lack of uniformity has generated a great deal of criticism, including that
from the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC), which
Congress authorized in 1994 to evaluate and recommend revisions to the
Bankruptcy Code.4 In its final report in 1997, the NBRC recommended that
the discount rate for present-value analysis "should be determined using a

2. This Article uses the terms "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" to refer to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006)).
3. See infra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which
intercircuit and intracircuit splits culminated in the Till decision).
4. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4106,
4147 (listing the duties of the NBRC).
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nationally recognized rate to promote the equal treatment of similarly
situated debtors and creditors,"5 but it failed to specify a particular rate.6
Not even the Supreme Court has been able to bring uniformity to bear
on the issue. When given the opportunity to do so in 2004, the Court in Till
v. SCS Credit Corp. could muster only a plurality opinion.7 In the wake of
Till, disarray over the discount-rate calculus continues to abound. Pursuant
to the test for determining the holding of a fragmented Court as articulated
in Marks v. United States,8 one court has concluded that no single standard
exists that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for the plurality
and concurring opinions in Till, such that no binding precedent resulted.9 In
contrast, another court applying the Marks test has reached the opposite
conclusion.10 And, making matters more interesting, the Fifth Circuit has
held that, for a case involving a factual scenario identical to that presented
in Till, the plurality opinion in Till constitutes binding authority (thus
rendering the Marks test inapplicable).11 Clearly, the issue of how to
conduct present-value analysis in bankruptcy remains unsettled.
To be sure, some of the blame for this doctrinal mess falls on Congress
for its repeated failure to specify the discount rate that a court ought to use
in its present-value analysis.12 But the rest of the blame falls on courts and
5. 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 261
(1997).
6. Id.
7. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
8. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’" (omission in original) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
9. See In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("The lack of a legal
rationale shared by five Justices leads to the inescapable conclusion that Till does not
produce binding precedent."). For commentary arguing that, under the Marks narrowestground test, Till did not produce binding precedent, see April E. Knight, Recent
Development, Balancing the Till: Finding the Appropriate Cram Down Rate in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations After Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1026–27
(2005).
10. See In re Flores, No. 05-38630/JWH, 2006 WL 4452973, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.J.
Mar. 29, 2006) (observing that, pursuant to the Marks test, the legal standard for calculating
present value can be ascertained from the plurality and concurring opinions in Till).
11. See Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Drive
Financial’s reliance on Marks is misplaced in this case because we are presented with
essentially the same facts that the Supreme Court was presented with in Till.").
12. In its most recent overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, Congress did nothing
to address the discount-rate calculus, with the exception of instructing a court to defer to
nonbankruptcy law in determining the rate when conducting present-value analysis for the
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commentators, who have failed to follow existing signposts throughout the
Code that ultimately reveal the appropriate discount rate. As a result of this
failure, a great deal of the debate over discounting in consumer bankruptcy
cases has been inappropriately couched in terms of adequately
compensating creditors for the opportunity cost and the default risk that
arise from deferred repayment by a debtor. Because these considerations
overlook, and sometimes even contravene, relevant Code provisions, the
discount-rate calculus has been analytically unsound. Moreover, no
comprehensive effort has been made to determine whether, and if so the
extent to which, the Code’s approach to present-value analysis squares with
the normative principles underlying bankruptcy law.
Beyond these matters of legal consequence, however, present-value
analysis is ultimately about money, plain and simple. In his critique of Till,
Robert Rasmussen has observed that the competing discount rates offered
by the debtor and the creditor translated into a mere $807.44 difference
over a three-year period, an amount "seemingly not much over which to
make a federal case."13 But if one recognizes that this type of controversy
is highly repetitious, then, Rasmussen observes, the significant economic
consequence of such litigation quickly becomes apparent:
What mattered, of course, was not the money at stake in [Till], but rather
what legal rule would govern future cases of this type. The lender is a
repeat player in bankruptcy, and how courts determine the applicable
rate of interest in a Chapter 13 plan is an issue that matters a lot to it. In
2004, there were approximately 450,000 Chapter 13 cases. To be sure,
not every Chapter 13 debtor has a car, but it is probably a safe bet that at
least half of them do. . . . [I]f we take half of the Chapter 13 cases and
assume that the amount at stake in Till represented an average in these
cases, that comes out to $180 million at stake for 2004 alone.14

Rasmussen’s estimate clearly does not account for the amounts at
stake in all consumer bankruptcy cases involving present-value analysis.
Individual debtors use Chapter 13 not only to retain cars, but also to retain
other types of property (both real and personal).15 If that property is subject
payment of tax claims. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 704(a), 119 Stat. 23, 125 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006)).
13. Robert K. Rasmussen, Creating a Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 323 (2007).
14. Id. at 324.
15. During the 2009 calendar year, the total amount of assets reported by individual
debtors who filed for Chapter 13 relief exceeded $66.1 billion (with approximately $52.3
billion constituting real property and $13.8 billion constituting personal property). ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER P ROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 28 tbl.1D (2009),
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to a creditor’s lien, or if the property is owned free and clear but cannot be
claimed by the debtor as exempt property, the Code’s provision for presentvalue analysis will be triggered,16 thereby opening the door for a potential
dispute over the appropriate discount rate. When the disputes that
materialize are considered in conjunction with Rasmussen’s $180 million
estimate, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the amount at stake on an
annual basis is at least a quarter of a billion dollars.17
The main goal of this Article is to reconceptualize present-value
analysis in consumer bankruptcy. It argues that, as a positive matter, the
Bankruptcy Code compels the use of a discount rate that accounts solely for
expected inflation, but that does not take into account opportunity cost or
the risk of nonpayment.
Part II.A describes the Code provisions that require a court to conduct
present-value analysis as a condition to Chapter 13 plan confirmation. Part
II.B discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. in
which a fractured Court arguably failed to provide a binding rule for
present-value analysis as applied to the payment of secured claims in
Chapter 13. Part III critiques the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till—
both of which advocated a risk-adjusted discount rate—for their failure to
interpret the Code properly. Part III also builds on Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion, which advocated a risk-free discount rate, to
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/
2009/Table1D.pdf. It is the case, of course, that some debtors will choose not to retain their
assets in their Chapter 13 cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (2006) (providing that a
debtor may satisfy the claim of a creditor that is secured by property by surrendering the
property to the creditor). But even if only a quarter of the amounts from 2009 represented
the property sought to be retained by Chapter 13 debtors, the amounts involved are still quite
substantial.
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing when the Chapter 13 provisions for present-value
analysis apply).
17. In support of this conservative estimate, consider that total disbursements during
the 2009 fiscal year by Chapter 13 trustees to secured creditors that were owed nonmortgage
debt exceeded $1.3 billion. See U.S. Trustee Program, Chapter 13 Handbooks & Reference
Materials, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter13/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011) (providing Chapter 13 statistics by fiscal year) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Present-value analysis is usually not implicated in the
context of mortgage debt because the Bankruptcy Code generally prohibits a debtor from
modifying the rights of a creditor whose claim is secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor’s principal residence. 11 U.S.C. § 1332(b)(2). There are
exceptions, however, such as when the mortgage is not on the debtor’s principal residence
(in which case the Code’s anti-modification provision does not apply in the first instance).
Another exception is when the mortgage is on the debtor’s principal residence, but the last
payment on the mortgage is contractually due prior to the final payment scheduled in the
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. Id. § 1322(c)(2).
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demonstrate the propriety of using an inflation rate for discounting
payments in consumer bankruptcy. Part IV describes the limited
circumstances pursuant to which the Code allows the recovery of interest
(i.e., amounts relating to opportunity cost, expected inflation, and risk of
nonpayment) that matures subsequent to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing. This
descriptive account further bolsters the Article’s positive theory of presentvalue analysis in consumer bankruptcy. Finally, Part V sets forth the
normative arguments that justify the Article’s positive theory of presentvalue analysis.
II. The Problem and the Court’s Solution
An individual who files for bankruptcy generally faces the decision of
filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Code.18 One of the most
significant functional differences between the two chapters relates to the
manner in which creditor claims are paid. Claim repayment in Chapter 7
involves the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the debtor’s prebankruptcy, nonexempt assets.19 On the other hand, claim repayment in
Chapter 13 involves the distribution of the debtor’s post-bankruptcy
income.20 Because claim repayment in Chapter 13 constitutes a deferred
18. A debtor may voluntarily commence a bankruptcy case by filing with the
bankruptcy court a petition under the particular operative chapter of the Bankruptcy Code
pursuant to which he or she seeks relief. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a). Individual debtors may file for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 109(b), (d); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 160–61, 166 (1991). However, Chapter 11 filings by individual debtors constitute
a small percentage of total consumer filings. See, e.g., JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app. at 291 tbl.F-2 (2010), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Judic
ialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (indicating that there were 1,306
nonbusiness Chapter 11 filings of a total 1,344,095 nonbusiness filings during the twelvemonth period ending September 30, 2009). Individuals who are family farmers with regular
income are eligible to file for relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(f). Chapter 12 filings likewise constitute a very small percentage of bankruptcy
filings by individuals. See, e.g. , DUFF, supra, app. at 291 tbl.F-2 (indicating that there were
487 Chapter 12 filings during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2009).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (providing that commencement of a case creates an
estate consisting of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case"); id. § 704(a)(1) (requiring the trustee to "collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate"); id. § 726(a) (providing for distribution of property of the
estate); id. § 522(b) (allowing debtor to claim as exempt certain property from property of
the estate).
20. See id. § 1322(a)(1) (requiring that the plan "provide for the submission of all or
such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and
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stream of future payments, the Code requires that, as a condition to
confirmation of the debtor’s repayment plan, the payments to the creditor
be discounted to their present value.21 Unfortunately, the Code does not
expressly set forth how to calculate the appropriate discount rate to confirm
that creditors in Chapter 13 will be properly compensated.
From the time that Congress enacted the Code in 1978,22 courts
developed different approaches to address this issue.23 The diverging
results across and within circuits eventually led the Supreme Court in 2004,
in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., to consider the issue as applied to the
repayment of secured claims in Chapter 13.24 Although the plurality and
the dissent disagreed on the methodology for calculating the discount rate,
they ultimately agreed that the rate must incorporate a premium for risk.25
In stark contrast, Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment to reverse
and remand the case to the bankruptcy court, disagreed with the consensus
underlying the plurality and dissenting opinions.26 In his view, the Code’s
discount-rate calculus does not call for any risk adjustment.27
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan"). A Chapter 7 debtor’s
post-bankruptcy income is excluded from the debtor’s estate. Id. § 541(a)(6). Thus, such
income is not available as a source of property for the repayment of creditor claims in
Chapter 7. Id. § 726(a). In contrast, a Chapter 13 debtor’s post-bankruptcy income is
included in the debtor’s estate. Id. § 1306(a)(2). The Code permits a Chapter 13 debtor to
retain all property of the estate not used to repay creditor claims. Id. §§ 1306(b), 1327(b).
That said, the Code does authorize a debtor to use pre-bankruptcy assets, in addition to postbankruptcy income, to repay creditor claims. Id. § 1322(a)(8). The functional difference in
claim repayment under the two chapters has been described as "the basic chapter 13
bargain." David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13
Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585, 585–86 (2009).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (setting forth requirement for discounting property
distributed on account of allowed nonpriority unsecured claims); id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
(setting forth requirement for discounting property distributed on account of allowed secured
claims). But see id. § 1322(a)(2) (omitting any requirement that deferred cash payments to
priority unsecured claims be discounted to present value).
22. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006)).
23. See 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 259 ("The absence of a
statutory authority has led courts to employ different methods to determine the appropriate
rate of interest."); David G. Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down
Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 443–59 (1998) (summarizing the various approaches to
present-value analysis adopted by courts of appeals prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)).
24. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 491–92, 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. Id.
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Part II.A sets forth a brief overview of the general principles governing
present-value analysis of claim repayment in Chapter 13. Against this
backdrop, Part II.B discusses the Court’s decision in Till.
A. Present-Value Analysis in Chapter 13
A debtor’s Chapter 13 plan must satisfy various standards in order to
be confirmed.28 Among those standards are two key provisions regarding
the amount of property, usually income,29 that a debtor must distribute to
allowed claims, both secured and unsecured. The confirmation standard
for payment of allowed unsecured claims, commonly referred to as the
"best interest of creditors test,"30 will be satisfied if "the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code] on such date."31 In those
instances where the debtor proposes to retain the property securing a
holder’s claim and where the holder of the allowed secured claim has not
accepted the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan,32 a process commonly referred to
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa indicates that the confirmation standards for a Chapter
13 plan are mandatory and that bankruptcy courts have an independent obligation to ensure
compliance with those standards. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct.
1367, 1381 (2010) (stating that "§ 1325(a) instructs a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan
only if the court finds, inter alia, that the plan complies with the ‘applicable provisions’ of
the Code"); id. at 1381 n.14 (stating that Code § 1325(a) "requires bankruptcy courts to
address and correct a defect in a debtor’s proposed plan even if no creditor raises the issue");
Shaw v. Aurgroup Fin. Credit Union, 552 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that
confirmation standards for a Chapter 13 plan are mandatory); Wachovia Dealer Servs. v.
Jones (In re Jones), 530 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Barnes v. Barnes (In re
Barnes), 32 F.3d 405, 407 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is a
mandatory requirement for plan confirmation). But see In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1412
(3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that Code § 1325(a) is a nonmandatory provision that "leaves an
area of discretion for the court to confirm a plan which comports with the mandatory
provisions of § 1322, but does not meet the conditions of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)–(iii)").
Additional standards must be satisfied if the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured
claim objects to plan confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing differences in claim
repayment in Chapters 7 and 13).
30. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6385.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
32. If the holder of an allowed secured claim has accepted the plan, the confirmation
standard for the payment of the allowed secured claim will be satisfied. 11 U.S.C.
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as "cramdown,"33 the confirmation standard for payment of allowed
secured claims will be satisfied if, among other things, "the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of [each allowed secured] claim is not less than the allowed amount
of such claim."34
The language of the two confirmation standards is quite similar and
worth noting. Consider a side-by-side comparison of the two statutory
provisions, broken down into their constituent parts, as set forth in Table 1.
Table 1: Chapter 13 Confirmation Standards for Claim Repayment
Code § 1325(a)(4):
Allowed Unsecured Claims

Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii):
Allowed Secured Claims

(A1) the value, as of the
(B1) the value, as of the effective
effective date of the plan, of property date of the plan, of property to be
to be distributed under the plan on distributed under the plan on account
account of each allowed unsecured of [each allowed secured] claim
claim
is not less than
is not less than
(B2) the allowed amount of such
(A2) the amount that would be claim
paid on such claim if the estate of the
debtor were liquidated under chapter 7
of [the Bankruptcy Code] on such date

Both provisions establish inequalities that, if not satisfied, will
preclude plan confirmation.35 In the case of payment of an allowed
unsecured claim, the Code requires a comparison of (1) the discounted
present value of property to be distributed to the holder of the claim (i.e.,
the amount denominated A1 in Table 1)36 to (2) the payment the holder
§ 1325(a)(5)(A). Alternatively, if the debtor surrenders the property securing an allowed
secured claim, the confirmation standard will likewise be satisfied. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
33. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 436–38 (discussing cramdown process). For the
origins of the phrase "cramdown," see William Safire, On Language: Cramdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 12.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory nature of Chapter
13 plan confirmation requirements).
36. The amount denominated A1 in Table 1 requires a court (a) to ascertain the
nominal amount of property that will be distributed to the holder of the allowed unsecured
claim under the plan and (b) to then calculate the value of such property as of the effective
date of the plan. It is the latter step that entails discounting the stream of income payments
that will be received by the claim holder over a period that could possibly extend up to five
years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (setting forth limits on the duration of a Chapter 13 plan).
Specifically, the future stream of income payments (and/or other property distributed) will
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would receive in an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor’s estate
(i.e., the amount denominated A2 in Table 1).37 The plan can be confirmed
only if the former equals or exceeds the latter (i.e., A1 > A2). In the case of
cramdown payment of an allowed secured claim, the Code requires a
comparison of (1) the discounted present value of property to be distributed
to the holder of the claim (i.e., the amount denominated B1 in Table 1) to
(2) the allowed amount of the secured claim (i.e., the amount denominated
B2 in Table 1), an amount that entails a valuation of the property securing
the claim.38 Again, the plan can be confirmed only if the former equals or
exceeds the latter (i.e., B1 > B2).
There are critical points regarding the basic framework for claim
repayment in Chapter 13 that should not be overlooked. First, the
be discounted back to the effective date of the plan. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 414
(1977) (noting that valuation as of the effective date of the plan "contemplates a present
value analysis that will discount value to be received in the future"), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6370. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "effective date of
the plan." See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (failing to include "effective date of the plan" among the
definitions applicable throughout the Bankruptcy Code). A debtor may set forth a provision
in his or her Chapter 13 plan that specifies a particular date as the "effective date" of the
plan. E.g., In re Gibson, 415 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870,
872 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). For further discussion regarding the effective date of a plan, see
Carlson, supra note 20, at 601.
37. The statutory language relating to the amount denominated A2 in Table 1 refers to
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation on the effective date of the Chapter 13 plan—in other
words, an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation that does not involve delay. It has been argued,
however, that the amount distributed in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation should be
discounted to present value in order to reflect the reality that liquidation of a debtor’s estate
is a process that takes time. See 1 HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 12.3.2, at 292 n.62 (John Rao ed., 8th ed. 2006) (stating that, in conducting
the "best interests of creditors test" under Code § 1325(a)(4), "the court should also take into
account the delay which occurs before creditors receive dividends in a chapter 7 case"); cf.
Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J.
551, 567–68 (1995) (arguing that the "best interests of creditors test" under Code
§ 1129(a)(7) should be amended "so that it looks at present-value dollars that would be
distributed from the estate in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case where conversion commences on
the effective date of the plan and not at a distribution that assumes an instantaneous
liquidation"). In some instances, the process can take years. See In re Smith, 431 B.R. 607,
611 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010) (noting that, in one Chapter 7 case, "distribution to unsecured
creditors did not occur for over two years after the petition date" and that "[t]his amount of
time is not unusual for administration of an average chapter 7 estate").
38. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the
Bankruptcy Code defines the secured status of an allowed claim); see also Epstein, supra
note 23, at 438 (noting that cramdown first requires a court to "determine the value of the
creditor’s collateral" and subsequently to "determine the value of the deferred payments
proposed by the plan to determine whether the present value of such payments at least equals
the value of the collateral").
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confirmation threshold for claim repayment is keyed to substantive
entitlements specified elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. The entitlements
are represented by the amount denominated A2 (in the case of allowed
unsecured claims) and the amount denominated B2 (in the case of allowed
secured claims). Second, once the threshold has been established, the
question becomes whether the property that the debtor plans to distribute
over the life of the plan has a discounted present value that, at a minimum,
equals the threshold. In other words, the discounting process seeks to
verify that, notwithstanding the delay in payment, the claim holder is
scheduled to receive the equivalent of its present-day substantive
entitlement.39 As a matter of statutory design, that process is articulated in
a content-neutral manner. A comparison of the discounting process for
unsecured claims (denominated A1 in Table 1) and for secured claims
(denominated B1 in Table 1) reveals nearly identical language such that the
discounting process should be the same for both classes of claims.40 With
39. See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993) ("[A] creditor receives the
‘present value’ of its claim only if the total amount of the deferred payments includes the
amount of the underlying claim plus an appropriate amount of interest to compensate the
creditor for the decreased value of the claim caused by the delayed payments."); H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977) (noting that "property is to be valued as of the effective date of
the plan, thus recognizing the time-value of money"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6369; Dean Pawlowic, Entitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV.
J. 149, 173 (1995) (noting that "the entitlement to receive plan interest is merely a means to
provide for present value").
40. See, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) ("We think it likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to
follow essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any
of these provisions."); In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (considering
the language of Code §§ 1325(a)(4) and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and concluding "that Congress
would intend identical language to have identical meaning when it is used twice in the same
section of the Code"); In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 845 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994)
("[A]lmost all courts which have examined the concept of present value in Chapters 11, 12,
and 13 treat present value as a universal concept throughout the Code. . . . This Court’s
analysis will proceed accordingly."), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v.
Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997); Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 169
("For purposes of present value analysis, bankruptcy cases have not been distinguished on
the basis of the chapters under which they were filed, and the concept of present value has
been construed to have a single meaning wherever it is used in the Code."); cf. Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have often invoked the normal
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning. That rule must surely apply, a fortiori, to the use of
identical words in the same section of the same enactment." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). For an extended discussion on the applicability of case law and concepts
from Chapter 13 cases when similar issues arise in Chapter 11 cases, and vice versa, see
generally David G. Epstein & Christopher Fuller, Chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code—Observations on Using Case Authority from One of the Chapters in Proceedings
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these considerations in mind, the discussion now turns to the Court’s
interpretation of present-value analysis as applied to cramdown payments in
Chapter 13.
B. Till v. SCS Credit Corp.
Till involved a dispute between the Tills, a married couple who jointly
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Code, and SCS Credit
Corporation (SCS), the creditor to whom the Tills were indebted on account
of a retail installment contract for a used truck that was subject to SCS’s
purchase-money security interest.41 The Tills sought to retain the used
truck and, in so doing, proposed to make cramdown payments to SCS,42
whose $4,894.89 claim was undersecured due to the $4,000 value of the
truck securing the claim.43 Consequently, SCS’s claim was bifurcated into
an allowed secured claim of $4,000 and an allowed unsecured claim of
$894.89.44The Chapter 13 plan provided that the Tills would pay interest
on SCS’s allowed secured claim at the rate of 9.5%, one-and-a-half
percentage points above the national prime rate.45 SCS objected to the plan,
arguing that the Tills would have to pay interest at the rate of 21% in order
to compensate SCS adequately.46 The interest rate suggested by SCS
happened to be the interest rate set forth in the contract between the Tills
and SCS.47 Thus, the task for the Court was to ascertain whether the Tills’
proposed cramdown payments adequately compensated SCS.48 The
remainder of this Section will begin by considering how the plurality and
Under the Other, 38 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1985). In that discussion, Epstein and Fuller offer
arguments for why a valid approach to present-value analysis in Chapter 13 may be equally
applicable in Chapter 11. Id. at 905–10; see also Epstein, supra note 23, at 469 ("The
present Congressional language, ‘value, as of the effect[ive] date of the plan,’ does not
support a fixed cram down interest rate or support handling Chapter 13 cram down interest
rate proceedings different from Chapter 11 cram down interest rate proceedings.").
41. Till, 541 U.S. at 469–70 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 471.
43. Id. at 470.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 470.
See id. at 474 (stating that Chapter 13 cramdown provision ensures that "property

to be distributed to a particular secured creditor over the life of a bankruptcy plan has a total
‘value, as of the effective date of the plan,’ that equals or exceeds the value of the creditor’s
allowed secured claim—in this case, $4,000").
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dissenting opinions conceived of the underlying substance of the
discounting process and will then contrast those opinions to Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion.
1. The Plurality and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion begins by framing present-value
analysis as the function of an interest rate that consists of the three
components traditionally included in an interest rate—opportunity cost, a
premium for expected inflation, and a premium for the risk of default:49
A debtor’s promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate
payment of the same total amount because the creditor cannot use the
money right away, inflation may cause the value of the dollar to decline
before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment.
The challenge for bankruptcy courts reviewing such repayment schemes,
therefore, is to choose an interest rate sufficient to compensate the
creditor for these concerns.50

Further entrenching the concept of present-value analysis as a function
of garden-variety interest-rate payments, Justice Stevens repeatedly invoked
a loan metaphor—specifically, that the creditor to whom the debtor makes
cramdown payments essentially makes a forced loan, or "cramdown loan,"
to the debtor.51 This metaphor unfortunately obfuscates matters insofar as
cramdown, a statutory directive involving a pre-existing secured-credit
relationship in which the debtor had likely already defaulted, is far removed

49. See RICHARD A. P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 194 (7th ed. 2007)
(identifying the "three main components" of an interest rate as the opportunity cost, the risk
premium, and the anticipated inflation rate); Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 173–74 ("This
compensation includes three components: (1) the real rate . . . (2) an expected inflation
rate . . . and (3) a risk premium . . . ."); cf. Edward R. Morrison, Timbers of Inwood Forest,
the Economics of Rent, and the Evolving Dynamics of Chapter 11, in BANKRUPTCY LAW
STORIES 21, 29 (Robert K. Rasmussen ed., 2007) (noting that rate of return "compensates
investor for the time value of money . . . and risk"); Alan Schwartz, Valuation of Collateral,
in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES, supra, at 103, 108 ("Two elements constitute an interest
rate[:] the rate must compensate the lender for the time value of money, and the rate must
compensate the lender for bearing the risk of nonpayment.").
50. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 477 (stating that a "court should aim . . . to ensure that an
objective economic analysis would suggest the debtor’s interest payments will adequately
compensate all such creditors for the time value of their money and the risk of default").
51. See id. at 475 n.12, 476 & n.14, 477 (using repeatedly the term "cramdown loan").
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from the concept of a market-based transaction involving a new extension
of credit by a creditor to a debtor.52
With the loan metaphor as a backdrop, Justice Stevens set forth a
present-value analysis that presumptively establishes the national prime rate
as the appropriate discount rate.53 For the plurality, one of the hallmarks of
the prime rate that makes it an appropriate discount rate is that it
"compensate[s] for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation,
and the relatively slight risk of default."54 The plurality, however, allowed
for the possibility of an upward adjustment of the prime rate in order to
account for the risk of nonpayment by a debtor in bankruptcy (as opposed
to a solvent and creditworthy commercial borrower).55 While the plurality
52. One need look no further than Code § 364, which governs the obtaining of postpetition credit and incurring of debt by a debtor’s estate to confirm that the distribution
provided to a creditor on account of its pre-petition claim is conceptually distinct from the
post-petition extension of credit to a debtor’s estate, which gives rise to a post-petition claim
against the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006); Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook
Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35
F.3d 860, 867 n.7 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing in the context of the allowance of
administrative expense claims how post-petition use of collateral by a debtor without
creditor consent does not actually entail an extension of credit to the debtor’s estate). The
Till plurality, however, failed to appreciate this distinction. Instead, it improperly conflated
the concepts of Chapter 11 cramdown under Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and post-petition
financing for Chapter 11 debtors under Code § 364. See Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) (discussing the manner in which the market for debtor-in-possession
financing might inform the cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case).
Moreover, use of the loan metaphor seems inconsistent in light of Justice Stevens’s
rejection of the "coerced loan approach" to present-value analysis. Id. at 477. The
descriptive account of that approach turns on the concept of a creditor required to lend
against its will to the debtor post-bankruptcy. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 845 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1994), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick),
121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997). One would think that rejection of the approach would
reasonably entail distancing oneself from the rationale’s rhetoric. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583,
596–97 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti),
105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953 (1997). Justice Stevens obviously conceptualized the cramdown loan as something
different than what the coerced loan approach requires. Till, 541 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion). But, by relying on the loan metaphor, the plurality improperly framed the
issue, which in turn resulted in imprecise analysis. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the
plurality and dissenting opinions in Till failed to interpret the Code properly).
53. Till, 541 U.S. at 478–79 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 484
(referring to prime rate as a "presumptive rate" that can be rebutted).
54. Id. at 479.
55. See id. ("Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment
than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust
the prime rate accordingly.").
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did not set forth a scale that would be appropriate for risk adjustment,56 it
specified that "the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security,
and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan" would be
appropriate factors to consider in making an upward risk adjustment.57
Finally, pursuant to the plurality’s "formula" or "prime-plus" approach for
calculating the discount rate,58 the burden of proof falls on the creditor,
whom the plurality viewed as the better informed party, to justify the risk
adjustment.59
Like the plurality, the dissent in Till interpreted the Code as requiring
that the discount rate used in present-value analysis incorporate a risk
premium for nonpayment by the debtor.60 Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion argues, however, for a present-value analysis that presumptively
establishes the contract interest rate as the appropriate discount rate,61 with
the possibility that either upward or downward adjustments of the rate
could be sought by either the debtor or the creditor.62 From the dissent’s
perspective, the initial estimate provided by the contract rate is likely to be
more accurate than the prime rate, thereby resulting in less litigation and its
concomitant costs.63 Finally, like the plurality, Justice Scalia identified
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
See id. at 479 ("[S]tarting from a concededly low estimate and adjusting upward

places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors, who are likely to have readier access
to any information from the debtor’s filing . . . ."); id. at 484–85 ("[T]he formula approach,
which begins with a concededly low estimate of the appropriate interest rate and requires the
creditor to present evidence supporting a higher rate, places the evidentiary burden on the
more knowledgeable party, thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the appropriate
interest rate.").
60. See id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality and dissent "agree
that any deferred payments to a secured creditor must fully compensate it for the risk that
[Chapter 13 plan] failure will occur"); id. at 508 ("Eight Justices are in agreement that the
rate of interest set forth in the debtor’s approved plan must include a premium for risk.").
61. See id. at 494 (stating that "the contract rate is a decent estimate, or at least the
lower bound, for the appropriate rate in cramdown").
62. See id. at 494 n.2 ("The contract rate is only a presumption, however, and either
party remains free to prove that a higher or lower rate is appropriate in a particular case.").
63. See id. at 500 ("[I]t is far more important that the initial estimate be accurate than
that the burden of proving inaccuracy fall on the better informed party."). Perhaps not
surprisingly, the plurality argued that the formula approach yields the more accurate risk
estimate and minimizes litigation costs. See id. at 484–85 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(arguing that the formula approach "places the evidentiary burden on the more
knowledgeable party, thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the appropriate
interest rate"); id. at 479 ("[T]he formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and
objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary
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those factors that should inform a risk premium adjustment, noting that "the
most relevant factors bearing on risk premium are (1) the probability of
plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the liquidity of the
collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of enforcement."64
He further noted that the contract rate had the advantage of already having
incorporated such factors.65
Based on the foregoing discussion, one sees that the plurality and
dissenting opinions in Till disagreed over the manner in which risk
assessment should be incorporated into present-value analysis, rather than
whether such analysis should adjust for risk in the first instance.66 It is this
latter point, however, on which Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion is
diametrically opposed to both the plurality and the dissent.
2. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which embraces a plain-meaning
approach to interpreting the Chapter 13 cramdown provision,67 begins by
shifting present-value analysis away from the loan metaphor, which in turn
facilitates reconceptualizing the discount rate as a rate that should not
account for risk of default:
Both the plurality and the dissent ignore the clear text of the statute
[Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)] in an apparent rush to ensure that secured
creditors are not undercompensated in bankruptcy proceedings. But the
statute that Congress enacted does not require a debtor-specific risk
adjustment that would put secured creditors in the same position as if
they had made another loan.68

proceedings.").
64. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 484 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(discussing risk-premium factors identified by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he plurality and dissent agree that the
proper method for discounting deferred payments to present value should take into account
each of these factors, but disagree over the proper starting point for calculating the risk of
nonpayment."); id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("My areas of agreement with the plurality
are substantial. . . . Our only disagreement is over what procedure will more often produce
accurate estimates of the appropriate interest rate.").
67. See id. at 486, 489 (Thomas, J., concurring) (making references to "the clear text
of the statute" and "the plain language of the statute").
68. Id. at 486.
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With this frame, Justice Thomas proceeded to explain why the Code
compels the use of a risk-free discount rate for present-value analysis.
The linchpin for Justice Thomas’s argument is that the language of the
Chapter 13 cramdown provision focuses solely on the value of the property
the debtor proposes to distribute to a claim holder rather than the value of a
promise to distribute property.69 In other words, when the Code uses the
language "property to be distributed under the plan,"70 Justice Thomas
would read the Code as instructing the court (1) to identify the property that
the debtor proposes to distribute to the claim holder over the life of the
Chapter 13 plan,71 and then (2) to conduct a present-value analysis of that
property with the assumption that such property will in fact be distributed.72
On this reading, one assumes away risk of default when ascertaining the
appropriate discount rate, thereby yielding a risk-free rate.73 Further
justifying the use of a risk-free rate, Justice Thomas pointed to other
Chapter 13 confirmation standards that serve a protective function for
creditors—namely, the requirements that (1) a Chapter 13 plan must be
proposed in good faith,74 (2) a creditor whose claim is crammed down must
retain the lien securing the claim,75 and (3) a Chapter 13 plan must be
financially feasible (including that the debtor must be able to make all
payments under the plan)76—all of which mitigate risk of default.77
69. See id. at 486 (stating that Chapter 13 cramdown provision "requires only that ‘the
value . . . of property to be distributed under the plan,’ at the time of the effective date of the
plan, be no less than the amount of the secured creditor’s claim" (omission in original)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii))); id. at 487 ("The statute only requires the valuation
of the ‘property to be distributed,’ not the valuation of the plan (i.e., the promise to make the
payments itself).").
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).
71. See Till, 541 U.S. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Second, a court must
determine what is the ‘property to be distributed under the plan.’").
72. See id. ("Third, a court must determine the ‘value, as of the effective date of the
plan,’ of the property to be distributed."); id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that
Justice Thomas "reads the statutory phrase ‘property to be distributed under the plan’ to
mean the proposed payments if made as the plan contemplates" (citations omitted)); see also
Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 329–30 ("Justice Thomas, in essence, assumes that all
promised payments will be made.").
73. See Till, 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough there is always
some risk of nonpayment when A promises to repay a debt to B through a stream of
payments over time rather than through an immediate lump sum payment,
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does not take this risk into account.").
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
75. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I).
76. Id. § 1325(a)(6).
77. See Till, 541 U.S. at 490 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Given the presence of multiple
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Having rejected risk adjustment as part of present-value analysis, two
questions remain to be answered: first, whether the Thomas concurrence
specifies what factors ought to be considered in calculating the discount
rate; and second, whether a particular metric exists that accurately estimates
the rate. In answer to the first question, Thomas focused on the time value
of money as the sole factor that ought to inform the discount-rate calculus:
The requirement that the ‘value’ of the property to be distributed be
determined ‘as of the effective date of the plan’ incorporates the
principle of the time value of money. To put it simply, $4,000 today is
worth more than $4,000 to be received seventeen months from today
because if received today, the $4,000 can be invested to start earning
interest immediately.78

If time value of money is a function of a risk-free interest rate, then
Justice Thomas’s approach to present-value analysis would account only
for (1) opportunity cost and (2) expected inflation.79 To best approximate
this, Justice Thomas suggested that courts ought to rely on the prime rate as
the appropriate discount rate in present-value analysis.80 Ultimately, Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment of the plurality on the ground that the
interest rate proposed by the Tills exceeded the risk-free prime rate and thus
adequately compensated SCS.81
3. Till ’s Postmortem
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that all circuits had
either explicitly or implicitly rejected the concept of a "risk-free" discount
rate, and he further noted that Justice Thomas had failed to cite any
decisional law supporting his position.82 The Court’s failure to reach
consensus troubled Justice Scalia, who concluded his dissenting opinion by

creditor-specific protections, it is by no means irrational to assume that Congress opted not
to provide further protection for creditors by requiring a debtor-specific risk adjustment
under § 1325(a)(5).").
78. Id. at 486–87.
79. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that the three basic components
of an interest rate are (1) opportunity cost, (2) a premium for expected inflation, and (3) a
premium for risk of default).
80. Till, 541 U.S. at 488 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 491.
82. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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writing that "[t]oday’s judgment is unlikely to burnish the Court’s
reputation for reasoned decisionmaking."83
Commentators have been equally critical of the Court’s failure to
provide a definitive answer.84 Robert Rasmussen places the blame
predominantly on Justice Thomas, whom he accuses of having been the
most "tone-deaf to the situation."85 And even though Rasmussen lodges the
same accusation at Justice Stevens,86 Rasmussen partially absolves him,
observing that "[o]ne can . . . offer an intelligible defense of the result that
Justice Stevens reaches."87 The implication of that statement is quite clear:
Rasmussen believes that no intelligible defense exists for the Thomas
concurrence. This belief, in turn, leads Rasmussen to conclude that Justice
Thomas failed as a judge: Rather than compromise and cast his vote in a
way that would produce a majority opinion, thereby restoring some
functionality to the bankruptcy system, Justice Thomas heedlessly ventured
out on his own and left the doctrine of present-value analysis in a state of
disorder.88
The remainder of this Article takes a contrary view. It argues that, as a
descriptive matter, present-value analysis in consumer bankruptcy cases
requires use of a discount rate that accounts only for expected inflation, but
not default risk (as argued by Justice Thomas) or opportunity cost;89 and
that, moreover, such a rate is desirable from both a normative perspective
and an institutional-design perspective. But for Justice Thomas standing
his ground and voting his conviction, the Court would have issued a
precedential decision at odds with the text of and doctrine interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code. Admittedly, an unsettled state of the law is undesirable.
Worse yet, however, would have been an erroneously settled rule of
decision that would have bound all lower courts and could only be

83. Id. at 508.
84. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 321–22 ("The Supreme Court’s
fundamental task [in Till] was not so much to get it right as it was to get it done. On this
score, it failed."); Schwartz, supra note 49, at 114 n.18 (noting that, in light of the lack of a
majority for the plurality’s view in Till, the decision "has little practical value").
85. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 331.
86. See id. ("Justice Scalia, in his opinion, is not as tone-deaf to the situation as is
either Justice Thomas, or, as we shall see, Justice Stevens.").
87. Id. at 332.
88. See id. at 328 ("Justice Thomas was content to issue an opinion that left the issue
before the Court in an inconclusive draw.").
89. Such a rate would be even less compensatory than the one advocated by Justice
Thomas in Till.
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remedied either by the Court subsequently reversing itself or through
legislative override.
III. Textual and Contextual Arguments for an Inflationary Discount Rate
This Part challenges the long-standing notion that the discount rate in
Chapter 13 cases must be adjusted for default risk and does so by
examining closely other Code provisions relating to claim compensation as
well as Supreme Court doctrine interpreting some of those provisions. It
critiques the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till by marshalling the
statutory arguments missing from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion.
These arguments not only bolster his conclusion, but also extend it.
Part III.A focuses on the competing plain-meaning arguments offered
by Justices Thomas and Scalia regarding the statutory phrase "property to
be distributed under the plan"90 and demonstrates that such language cannot
be interpreted to require a Chapter 13 debtor to compensate a creditor for
default risk. Part III.B then argues that, when interpreting the phrase "as of
the effective date of the plan,"91 context similarly justifies omitting a risk
adjustment for default into the discount rate used in present-value analysis.
It examines each of the factors identified by the plurality and the dissent as
relevant to risk compensation and demonstrates why a contextual reading of
the Bankruptcy Code compels the opposite conclusion—namely, that
present-value analysis requires a risk-free discount rate.92
Part III.C concludes by arguing that a contextual interpretation also
compels a discount rate that does not take into account opportunity cost.
Pursuant to this view, even Justice Thomas’s approach to present-value
analysis overcompensates creditors. More precisely, the discount rate
ought to compensate solely for expected inflation and nothing more.
Accordingly, instead of using the prime rate to estimate the discount rate,
which would systematically overcompensate creditors for purposes of
present-value analysis, the Chapter 13 discount rate should be estimated
using the interest rate on short-term Treasury notes with a downward
adjustment that subtracts the real rate for the riskless cost of capital.

90. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).

91. Id.
92. Robert Rasmussen adamantly thinks otherwise. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at
328–30.
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A. "Property to Be Distributed"

In order to understand why Justices Thomas and Scalia reached
divergent conclusions regarding whether the discount rate must account for
the risk of nonpayment, it is critical to focus on the statutory language of
the cramdown provision, which both Justices interpreted pursuant to a
plain-meaning approach.93 The language at issue is that which instructs a
court to conduct present-value analysis—"the value, as of the effective date
of the plan, of property to be distributed."94 Justice Thomas deconstructed
this phrase into two main components: (1) "as of the effective date of the
plan" and (2) "property to be distributed."95 Justice Thomas viewed the
former phrase as encapsulating "the principle of the time value of money."96
Accordingly, whether or not the Bankruptcy Code requires compensation
for default risk depends on the meaning of the phrase "property to be
distributed."97
Justice Scalia accepted Justice Thomas’s analytical frame and, in
doing so, acknowledged that their competing interpretations of the phrase
"property to be distributed under the plan" would each be equally plausible
when considered in isolation.98 Justice Scalia, however, argued that a
contextual interpretation better supports his reading of the phrase,99 one that
accounts for the risk of nonpayment.100
93. See id. at 329–30 (observing that Justice Thomas "accuse[d] his brethren of textual
infidelity" and that Justice Scalia "focuse[d] squarely on the text of the Bankruptcy Code").
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
95. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 487 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing separately the meaning of the phrases "as of the effective date of the plan" and
"property to be distributed").
96. Id.
97. See id. at 487–88 (stating that "it is nonsensical to speak of a debtor’s risk of
default being inherent in the value of ‘property’ unless that property is a promise or a debt").
Without deconstructing the relevant text, Justice Stevens argued "that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)’s
reference to ‘value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan’ is better read to incorporate all of the commonly understood components of
‘present value,’ including any risk of nonpayment." Id. at 483 (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
98. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also conceded that Justice
Thomas’s interpretation that the Code mandates a risk-free discount rate is plausible, but
ultimately rejected the interpretation for precedential and practical concerns. Id. at 483 n.25
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In other words, the plurality took the view that it was
confronted with an egg that could not be unscrambled.
99. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See id. ("I would instead read this phrase to mean the right to receive payments
that the plan vests in the creditor upon confirmation. Because there is no guarantee that the
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An amendment to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 (subsequent to the Till
decision), while not necessarily determinative, strongly suggests that the
phrase "property to be distributed under the plan" cannot be interpreted to
signify that the value of that property must be discounted to account for risk
of default. Pursuant to that amendment, Congress added a requirement that
individual debtors who file for Chapter 11 relief devote all of their
disposable income (or its equivalent) to repaying creditor claims in the
event that an unsecured creditor objects to plan confirmation and the plan
does not propose to pay that creditor in full.101 The specific language of the
requirement, set forth in Code § 1129(a)(15), provides that the court cannot
confirm the debtor’s plan unless one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(15) In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation of the
plan—
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less
than the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the
date that the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for
which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer.102

Because subparagraphs (A) and (B) are set forth in the alternative, a
debtor’s Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of an
unsecured creditor so long as either subparagraph is satisfied.103 Notably,
subparagraph (A) includes the phrase "as of the effective date of the plan,"
whereas subparagraph (B) does not.104 Recall that, pursuant to the
promised payments will in fact be made, the value of this property right must account for the
risk of nonpayment.").
101. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 321(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2006)). The
amendment had the effect of bringing Chapter 11 plans filed by individual debtors more in
line with Chapter 13 plans, which were subject to a disposable income requirement prior to
the 2005 amendments. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2005); see also Bruce A.
Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in Chapter 11 After BAPCPA, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 77 ("‘Disposable income’ is a concept borrowed from chapter 13.
Indeed, § 1129(a)(15) refers to § 1325(b)(2) for a definition of the concept." (footnote
omitted)).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2006).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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analytical frame followed by Justices Thomas and Scalia, the phrase "as of
the effective date of the plan" prompts discounting that accounts for the
time value of money.105 On this account, subparagraph (A) requires that the
unsecured creditor be compensated for opportunity cost and the risk of
inflation, but subparagraph (B) does not.106
If Justice Scalia is correct that "property to be distributed" must be
interpreted to prompt discounting that accounts for risk of default, then
subparagraph (B) requires that the debtor distribute to the objecting
unsecured creditor a nominal amount of property that exceeds the projected
disposable income of the debtor to be received during the longer of five
years or the plan’s term.107 If the nominal amount of property is equal to or
less than the relevant amount of projected disposable income,
subparagraph (B) will not be satisfied by virtue of the fact that discounting
the nominal amount of property for default risk will result in property with
a present value that is less than the confirmation threshold.108
When one considers that Congress intended individual debtors to fund
their Chapter 11 plans predominantly (if not exclusively) with the income

105. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text (deconstructing competing
interpretations by Justices Thomas and Scalia of the phrase "value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of property to be distributed").
106. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (indicating that the time value of money
consists of opportunity cost and the anticipated inflation rate).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B). The Honorable Bruce Markell, U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge for the District of Nevada, has interpreted Code § 1129(a)(15)(B)’s projecteddisposable-income confirmation threshold as "requir[ing] the debtor to devote an amount
equal to five years’ worth of projected disposable income to the plan, with the five years
measured from the date the plan is confirmed or plan payments start, whichever is later."
Markell, supra note 101, at 87. That interpretation, however, cannot be squared with the
provision’s language. Subparagraph (B) sets the confirmation threshold according to the
projected disposable income that the debtor will receive during the longer of two time
periods: either (1) "during the 5-year period beginning on the date that that the first payment
is due under the plan" or (2) "during the period for which the plan provides payments." 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B). The statutory language clearly contemplates that the latter time
period (i.e., the plan’s term) could be less than, equal to, or greater than "the 5-year period
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan." Id. Thus, when the plan
term exceeds five years, Code § 1129(a)(15)(B), by virtue of its phrase "whichever is
longer," instructs a court to calculate the debtor’s projected disposable income during the
plan’s term and to use that estimate as the confirmation threshold (i.e., the value of the
property to be distributed under the plan must be greater than or equal to the projecteddisposable-income estimate). See, e.g., In re Washington, No. 09-3013-BJH-11, 2010 WL
1417708, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2010).
108. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which
discounting reduces the present value of property to be distributed in the future).
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they generate subsequent to filing for bankruptcy,109 it becomes apparent
that interpreting the phrase "property to be distributed" to require
discounting for default risk could frequently lead to an absurd result. It is
reasonable to assume that most individual debtors who file for Chapter 11
will not have sufficient pre-bankruptcy assets and post-bankruptcy income
to fully repay their unsecured creditors. As such, if an unsecured creditor
objects to plan confirmation, the debtor will be able to overcome the
objection only by satisfying subparagraph (B).
Assuming that
subparagraph (B) requires discounting for default risk, then no debtor could
ever satisfy subparagraph (B) with income alone. If a debtor’s plan solely
proposed to distribute all of the debtor’s disposable income, the value of the
income, once discounted, would be less than the nominal amount of
disposable income generated by the debtor. Accordingly, the only way to
satisfy subparagraph (B) would be for the debtor to liquidate prebankruptcy assets to make up the difference.
The Code certainly contemplates the possibility of the sale of assets by
a Chapter 11 debtor.110 That said, it seems highly illogical that Congress
would have devised a statutory scheme like the one just described.
Consider the example of an individual debtor who has initially proposed to
devote all of his projected disposable income to fund his Chapter 11 plan.
Further suppose that the proposed payments will be solely devoted to fully
repaying (as required by the Code): (1) objecting creditors with secured
claims that have been subjected to cramdown,111 and (2) creditors whose
unsecured claims are entitled to priority.112 Pursuant to this scenario, the
debtor does not have surplus disposable income to make any payment to
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8) (providing that a plan shall, "in a case in which the
debtor is an individual, provide for payment to creditors under the plan of all or such
portions of earnings . . . or other future income of the debtor as is necessary for the execution
of the plan").
110. See id. § 1123(a)(5) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan shall "provide adequate
means for the plan’s implementation, such as . . . sale of all or any part of the property of the
estate"); id. § 1123(b)(4) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan may "provide for the sale of all or
substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale
among holders of claims or interests"); see also Markell, supra note 101, at 77 (noting that,
"if property from any other source—such as loans or gifts, or from exempt property—is used
to supplement the payments to unsecured creditors, the [Chapter 11] plan may be shorter
than five years"). For the argument theorizing that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot be forced to
liquidate assets for the benefit of creditors, see Carlson, supra note 20, passim.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (requiring that a holder of a secured claim
receive deferred cash payments whose present value is equal to the allowed secured claim).
112. See id. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring that holders of priority unsecured claims be fully
repaid in cash).
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creditors with allowed nonpriority unsecured claims (i.e., general unsecured
creditors). Nonetheless, one of those creditors objects to plan confirmation
under Code § 1129(a)(15).113
As things currently stand in this hypothetical, the creditor will prevail
in its objection. Because the debtor’s plan does not propose to distribute
any property to the creditor, the plan does not satisfy Code
§ 1129(a)(15)(A), which requires the creditor’s claim to be fully repaid
(taking into account present-value considerations).114 Moreover, even
though the plan commits all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to
repaying creditor claims, the plan does not satisfy Code
§ 1129(a)(15)(B).115 As set forth above, if subparagraph (B) is interpreted
to require discounting for default risk, then the value of the income, once
discounted, will be less than the nominal amount of disposable income
generated by the debtor. Thus, to overcome the creditor’s objection, the
hypothetical debtor will have to modify the Chapter 11 plan to provide for
the sale of a sufficient amount of estate property that will make up the
difference between the nominal value and present value of the debtor’s
disposable income.116 That difference will represent the premium for risk
of default under the plan.117
Simply put, this would be an absurd result. If the debtor were to
modify his plan to overcome the creditor’s objection, the proceeds would
not be distributed to the other creditors whose claims were proposed to be
fully repaid. Instead, the proceeds would go to the class of creditors with
allowed nonpriority unsecured claims. It seems ludicrous that, in a scenario
such as this, Congress would have intended such creditors to receive riskdefault premiums when the debtor’s plan did not originally propose to make
any payments to them (i.e., a situation in which default risk would be
irrelevant to the creditor class). One might counter that Congress’s intent in
enacting Code § 1129(a)(15)(B) was to provide a mechanism ensuring
some distribution to general unsecured creditors, but the language of
subparagraph (B) does not support that argument. Whereas the Chapter 13
disposable-income requirement is expressly tailored solely for the benefit of
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. § 1129(a)(15).
Id. § 1129(a)(15)(A).
Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B).
See id. § 1127(a) (providing for preconfirmation modification of a Chapter 11

plan).
117. Recall that, pursuant to Justice Scalia’s interpretation, the phrase "property to be
distributed" signals discounting for default risk. Supra notes 99–100 and accompanying
text.
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unsecured creditors,118 the Chapter 11 disposable-income requirement does
not identify any specific class of beneficiary.119
This absurd result can be avoided by interpreting the phrase "property
to be distributed under the plan" in the manner suggested by Justice
Thomas—that is, that the phrase does not mandate adjusting the presentvalue discount rate for risk of default. This analysis, however, merely
demonstrates that Justice Scalia was incorrect to interpret the phrase as
signifying the need for risk adjustment to the discount rate. Justice
Thomas’s analytical frame centers on the notion that it is the phrase "value,
as of the effective date of the plan" that signifies the need for discounting, a
frame that is consistent with the Code’s legislative history.120 The language
of the phrase is broad enough to allow for the possibility that the discount
rate must be adjusted for risk of default. The question thus becomes
whether the phrase can be justifiably interpreted in this way. Because of
the Code’s express silence on this issue, one must look elsewhere within the
Code’s structure for the answer.
B. Contextualizing the Propriety of a Risk-Free Discount Rate
As discussed above, both the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till
identify various factors that ought to be used to calculate the risk
adjustment to the discount rate used in present-value analysis.121 There are
a total of five factors identified in the two opinions, with some overlap
between the two opinions.122 Descriptively, one might recast these factors
as an equation that yields the creditor’s expected losses in the event of
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (requiring plan to provide "that all of the debtor’s
projected disposable income . . . will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors
under the plan").
119. See Markell, supra note 101, at 80 (noting that "[d]isposable income under chapter
11 need only be part of the ‘property to be distributed under the plan,’ which presumably
means some of it may be devoted to secured creditors and postpetition administrative
claimants" (footnote omitted)).
120. See supra notes 36, 39 (citing relevant legislative history).
121. Supra notes 57, 64 and accompanying text.
122. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) ("The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends, of course, on such factors as
the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of
the reorganization plan."); id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he most relevant factors
bearing on risk premium are (1) the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral
depreciation; (3) the liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of
enforcement.").
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default by the debtor (i.e., failure to complete the proposed payments),
where Pd represents the probability of default, Ca represents the costs that
would actually be incurred by the creditor in the event of default, and Ce
represents the expected default costs: Ca x Pd = Ce.123 The amount Ce is an
amount that, according to the plurality and dissent, should be reflected in
the total amount of property that the debtor’s plan proposes to distribute to
a creditor when he or she implements the cramdown option.124 A
contextual reading of the Code reveals that the amounts represented by both
Ca and Pd are irrelevant considerations in conducting present-value analysis
because the Code takes these amounts into account elsewhere, either for
purposes of plan confirmation or for purposes of creditor recovery.
1. Probability of Default (Pd)
To begin, consider the value represented by Pd —the probability of
default by the debtor under the plan. Both the plurality and the dissent
identified Pd as a central component of risk adjustment for present-value
analysis. While the dissent referred to "the probability of plan failure,"125
the plurality elaborated on the concept by referring to "the duration and
feasibility of the reorganization plan."126 In light of the plurality’s
elaboration, one might conceive of Pd as a function of both (1) plan length
(i.e., duration) and (2) the debt burden the proposed plan imposes on the
debtor (i.e., feasibility). It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that plan
length and debt burden should inform the likelihood of successfully
completing a Chapter 13 plan. A recent empirical study of case outcomes
in Chapter 13,127 however, suggests that only the former may be relevant.
That study found that plans of shorter duration were statistically
significantly associated with higher rates of completion.128 On the other
123. Cf. id. at 503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing an example of how a creditor’s
expected default costs would be calculated).
124. See id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Because bankrupt debtors typically
pose a greater risk of nonpayment than solvent commercial borrowers, the [formula]
approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate accordingly."); id. at 491
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny deferred payments to a secured creditor must fully
compensate it for the risk that . . . [plan] failure will occur.").
125. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
127. Scott F. Norberg & Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of
District Variations, and the Roles of Judges, Trustees and Debtors’ Attorneys in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (2007).
128. Id. at 454; see also In re Wirth, No. 09-12428-13, 2010 WL 2639873, at *2
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hand, the study did not find any statistically significant association between
the percentage of unsecured debt sought to be repaid and plan
completion.129 Of course, it may be that, if one were to look at other
measures of debt burden, such as the amount of secured debt sought to be
repaid or debt-to-income ratios, a statistically significant association would
be unearthed. Nevertheless, no one would dispute that a plan’s terms, when
considered on a case-by-case basis, ought to provide some picture of the
risk of default under the plan.130
The relevant question, however, is whether risk of default is a relevant
factor for purposes of present-value analysis. A contextual reading of the
Code suggests that risk of default should not be relevant in calculating the
discount rate given that financial feasibility is a confirmation standard
distinct from the cramdown confirmation standard. Code § 1325(a)(6)
provides that a Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed only if "the debtor will be
able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan."131
Both the plurality and the dissent took note of this provision in their
respective opinions,132 but neither reached the conclusion that the provision
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. June 28, 2010) (noting a higher dismissal rate for five-year plans than for
three- or four-year repayment plans in the Western District of Wisconsin during the ten-year
period beginning on January 1, 1995 and ending on December 31, 2004). The statistically
significant association did not persist, however, when separating the dismissed cases into
pre-confirmation and post-confirmation cases and comparing the plan length of each
category to the plan length of successfully completed cases. Norberg & Compo, supra note
127, at 454 n.64. Even with this alternate grouping, though, the association between plan
length and plan completion approached the conventional standard of statistical significance
(p ≤ 0.05), as indicated by the p-value of 0.093. Id.
129. Norberg & Compo, supra note 127, at 456.
130. For a summary of the various theories explaining the high failure rate of Chapter
13 plans, see 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 234.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). Courts use the term "feasibility"
to describe the confirmation requirement set forth in Code § 1325(a)(6). See, e.g., In re St.
Cloud and Jeudi, 209 B.R. 801, 809 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). The influence for doing so
likely stems from the Code’s legislative history, which states that "[t]he bankruptcy court
must confirm a [Chapter 13] plan if . . . the plan is feasible," among other things. S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 142 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5928. The legislative
history’s reference to feasibility, in turn, likely derives from the pre-Code confirmation
standard for Chapter XIII plans that required a court to find that the plan was "feasible."
Infra note 135.
132. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion directly quotes the provision as one example
of the "multiple creditor-specific protections" that evidence Congress’s intent "not to provide
further protection for creditors by requiring a debtor-specific risk adjustment under
§ 1325(a)(5)." Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 490 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 329–30 ("Justice Thomas, in essence, assumes that all
promised payments will be made.").
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precludes taking account of the risk of nonpayment when discounting to
present value the debtor’s proposed payments. The plurality merely
observed that the financial-feasibility requirement serves to reduce the
amount of default risk, but does not completely eliminate such risk.133 On
the other hand, the dissent took the view that the requirement generally
does not reduce the risk of default.134 In their discussions of the financialfeasibility requirement, both the plurality and dissent referred to empirical
evidence indicating a high rate of Chapter 13 plan failure,135 a phenomenon
that continues to be empirically documented.136 Both the plurality and
133. Till, 541 U.S. at 475 & n.12, 480 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
134. See id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that many confirmed Chapter 13 plans
fail and concluding that the high failure rate "proves that bankruptcy judges are not oracles
and that trustees cannot draw blood from a stone").
135. Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 493 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the Bankruptcy Code’s predecessor. Act of July 1, 1898,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). The 1898 Act allowed individual debtors to repay
their creditors through a court-supervised repayment plan under Chapter XIII of the Act,
which was enacted in 1938. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930–38. The
historical record suggests that Chapter XIII wage-earner plans had a low rate of completion.
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1327–28 (1976)
(testimony of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, District of Maine). This
occurred despite the financial-feasibility requirement for plan confirmation. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1056(a)(3) (1976) (requiring court to confirm Chapter XIII plan "if satisfied that . . . [the
plan] is feasible," among other requirements) (repealed 1978). The low success rate may
have been partly attributable to an excess of repayment optimism by debtors. COMM’N ON
THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, pt. 1, at 160 (1973); Henry A. Bundschu,
Administration of Wage Earners’ Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF.
BANKR. 55, 56 (1944). For an empirical account of outcomes in Chapter XIII cases filed in
five cities during the three years following Chapter XIII’s enactment, see Frederick
Woodbridge, Wage Earners’ Plans in the Federal Courts, 26 MINN. L. REV. 775, 818–19
(1942). For a historical discussion on the origins of Chapter XIII, see Timothy W. Dixon &
David G. Epstein, Where Did Chapter 13 Come from and Where Should It Go?, 10 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 741 (2002).
136. According to an empirical study of Chapter 13 cases that were filed in 1994 in
seven federal judicial districts, 351 of the 613 confirmed cases in the study’s sample were
either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7. Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor
Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 479, 506
tbl.19 (2006); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 233 ("For more than
a decade, two-thirds of all Chapter 13 plans have failed before the debtor completes
payments, and sometimes before unsecured creditors have received anything at all."); cf.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 15, at 64 tbl.6 (reporting that, of the 145,940
Chapter 13 cases dismissed during the 2009 calendar year, 71,114 cases (approximately
49%) were dismissed because of the debtor’s failure to make payments under the plan). Put
another way, the bankruptcy courts in the study erroneously determined the financial
feasibility of plan success in 57% of the confirmed cases.
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dissent chided bankruptcy courts for the high incidence of plan failure,137
but they diverged in their assessment of the implications of such failure in
conducting present-value analysis: The dissent took the view that the status
quo will continue, such that the risk adjustment should not be offset by the
financial-feasibility requirement;138 whereas the plurality took the view that
there should be some offset.139
What both the plurality and dissent fail to appreciate is that the
financial-feasibility requirement is framed as an all-or-nothing proposition:
The debtor will either be able or unable to make all payments.140 There is
no middle ground. Section 1325(a)(6) does not permit a court to confirm a
plan if it believes that the debtor will be able to make only some of the
payments under the plan. The court may only confirm if it is convinced
that the debtor will make all payments under the plan.141 In other words,
the court must be convinced that Pd = 0 for all confirmed plans.
If Pd = 0 for a confirmed plan, then there are no expected default costs
at the time of plan confirmation (i.e., Ce = 0). Accordingly, when a court
factors in any expected default cost into its present-value analysis, it does
so in contravention of the statutory scheme for plan confirmation. Any
time a court adjusts the discount rate for risk of nonpayment, it essentially
137. See Till, 541 U.S. at 482–83 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Perhaps bankruptcy
judges currently confirm too many risky plans, but the solution is to confirm fewer such
plans, not to set default cramdown rates at absurdly high levels, thereby increasing the risk
of default."); id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("That so many nonetheless failed proves that
bankruptcy judges are not oracles and that trustees cannot draw blood from a stone.").
Admittedly, a focus on plan failure as a metric for the effectiveness of Chapter 13 relief may
be too narrow. Norberg & Velkey, supra note 136, at 504; Woodbridge, supra note 135, at
819–20.
138. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 497 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that full compensation "cannot be attained by high-risk-plans and low interest rates,
which, absent cause to anticipate a change in confirmation practices, is precisely what the
formula approach would yield").
139. See id. at 482–83 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Perhaps bankruptcy judges
currently confirm too many risky plans, but the solution is to confirm fewer such plans, not
to set default cramdown rates at absurdly high levels, thereby increasing the risk of
default.").
140. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(6) (2006) (stating that a court shall confirm a plan if "the
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan"
(emphasis added)).
141. See Till, 541 U.S. at 490 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "a bankruptcy court
must ensure that ‘the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply
with the plan’" (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6)); cf. United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1381 n.14 (2010) (stating that Code § 1325(a)
"requires bankruptcy courts to address and correct a defect in a debtor’s proposed plan even
if no creditor raises the issue").
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admits that Pd > 0. A court, however, must deny plan confirmation when
that condition arises. To make matters worse, allowing such a risk
premium essentially allows a creditor in certain circumstances (e.g., a noasset case)142 to insure against plan default through the equivalent of an
unearned lien on the debtor’s postbankruptcy income—at the expense of
unsecured creditors.143 Any increase in the discount rate will reduce the
present value of the proposed cash flows under the debtor’s plan,144 with the
result that the debtor will have to increase the amount of payments so that
their present value is equal to the allowed amount of the creditor’s claim.
The portion of the income stream that correlates to the default risk
represents payments that, in the absence of the risk premium, would likely
have been distributed to unsecured creditors.145
142. A no-asset case is one in which the debtor does not have nonexempt assets
available for distribution to unsecured creditors. Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of
Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653, 664 (1999). If such a case were
administered under Chapter 7, no payment would be made to holders of allowed nonpriority,
unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). Accordingly, if a no-asset case is administered under
Chapter 13, the debtor’s repayment plan will satisfy the best-interest test, even though it
proposes not to make any payments to the class of general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(4); supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. A similar situation would arise if
the debtor did have nonexempt assets available for distribution, but those assets did not have
sufficient value—if the case were administered under Chapter 7—to exceed the amount of
allowed priority unsecured claims. In such a case, no payment would be made to holders of
allowed nonpriority unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a).
143. See In re Scott, 248 B.R. 786, 789 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[U]nless the debtor
has sufficient disposable income to pay all claims in full during a Chapter 13 case, the rules
for cramdown determine how the debtor’s plan payments are divided between secured and
unsecured creditors—the higher the cramdown payments, the lower the payments to
unsecured creditors."). I borrow the concept of a creditor acquiring an unearned lien through
the bankruptcy process from Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knippenberg. Lawrence
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of
Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 318–19 (1995).
144. Consider the following present-value formula, where pv is present value, f is the
income flow, i is the discount rate per compounding period, and n is the number of
compounding periods: pv = f/(1 + i)n. C. Frank Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy:
The Search for an Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D. L. REV. 42, 44 (1987).
When all other variables are held constant, pv decreases as i increases.
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (providing that, upon objection by the trustee or an
unsecured creditor, a court may not approve a plan unless "the plan provides that all of the
debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period
beginning on the date that the first payment is due . . . will be applied to make payments to
unsecured creditors"); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 261 ("[I]n
the current Chapter 13 system, the amount of money allocated to interest payments on
secured debt is deducted directly from the amount that otherwise would be available for
distribution to unsecured creditors."). The possibility exists, of course, that the surplus
disposable income in the absence of a risk premium could be sufficient to permit the debtor
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It may be argued that, when a court concludes that a debtor will be
able to make all payments under the plan, setting Pd at zero in the formula
for expected default costs results in an inappropriately narrow construction
of the Code’s financial-feasibility requirement for Chapter 13 plans. The
premise for this argument would be that the standard of proof associated
with a finding of financial feasibility does not require a court to predict with
absolute certainty successful completion of the repayment plan. Assuming
that the correct standard of proof for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is
preponderance of the evidence (the POE standard),146 a court need only find
that it is more likely than not that the debtor will be able to make all
payments under the plan.147 In quantitative terms, the court can make such
a finding if it is convinced that there is at least a 0.501 probability
(rounding to the nearest thousandth) of all proposed payments being
made.148 From this probability assessment, one could calculate for purposes
of present-value analysis a corresponding probability of default under the
plan and incorporate the figure as Pd in the formula for expected default
costs.149
to retain additional property through cramdown. In this case, the beneficiary of a risk-free
discount rate would be the holder of the crammed-down claim, rather than the general
unsecured creditors. Also, in those instances where the debtor proposes to pay 100% of the
unsecured claims, a risk-adjusted discount rate would not present the problem of the
unearned lien.
146. See In re Santiago, 404 B.R. 564, 570 n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) ("While the
standard of proof [for Chapter 13 plan confirmation] seems generally recognized as
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ there are some courts that require proof by clear and
convincing evidence." (citations omitted)); cf. Fin. Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans
Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in the context of Chapter 11 plan
confirmation); Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe
Enter., Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Arnold &
Baker Farms (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 177 B.R. 648, 655 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)
(same); In re Charles, 334 B.R. 207, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Absent a statute or rule
to the contrary, the burden of proof in a bankruptcy case is by a preponderance of the
evidence."). I borrow the phrase "POE standard" from Saul Levmore. Saul Levmore,
Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 726 (2001).
147. See In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 177 B.R. at 654 ("Proof by the preponderance of
the evidence means that it is sufficient to persuade the finder of fact that the proposition is
more likely true than not.").
148. See, e.g., Neil Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 399 (1985) (stating that the POE
standard is satisfied if the probability exceeds 0.5); Levmore, supra note 146, at 725–26
(same).
149. Any skepticism regarding the inclination of courts to conduct likelihood
assessments in resolving disputes that arise under the Bankruptcy Code can be dismissed.
Courts have calculated such probabilities, for example, when valuing a debtor’s contingent
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Imagine, for example, that a court finds it more likely than not that the
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan. This represents an
affirmative answer to the binary question of whether the financialfeasibility requirement—that is, 100% payment by the Chapter 13 debtor—
has been met by the POE standard, which is the equivalent of saying that
there is more than a 0.5 chance of a successful repayment plan. The extent
to which the quantum of proof offered by the debtor exceeds the POE
standard will surely vary across different cases. The court’s assessment, for
example, may be that the evidence presented suggests a 0.8 likelihood of a
successful repayment plan.150 In this example, the court can hold that the
financial-feasibility requirement has been satisfied and then proceed to use
this information in calculating risk of default for purposes of present-value
analysis. The court’s assessment of a 0.8 chance of successful plan is
similarly an assessment of a 0.2 chance of the debtor not making all
payments under the plan—in other words, plan default. Thus, the court
could set Pd in the formula for expected default costs to 0.2.
On this account, one can reconcile a finding of financial feasibility
with the incorporation of a premium for risk of default into the discount rate
used for present-value analysis. The risk factor merely represents the
degree of uncertainty of plan completion perceived by the court, even
though the court ultimately concludes that the debtor, more likely than not,
will succeed.151 To calculate Pd in the formula for expected default costs,
one merely subtracts the court’s likelihood assessment of financial
feasibility—that is, the probability of successful repayment (represented by
Ps)—from 1. Thus, Pd = 1 − Ps. Because the POE standard requires that Ps
liabilities for purposes of determining the debtor’s insolvency. See, e.g., Covey v.
Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Discounting a
contingent liability by the probability of its occurrence is good economics and therefore
good law, for solvency, the key to § 548(a)(2), is an economic term.").
150. Put another way, the court would reason that, if it were to observe the proffered
evidence ten times, the court would conclude eight times that the debtor would make all
payments under the plan and would conclude two times that the debtor would fail to make
all payments under the plan.
151. Epstein & Fuller, supra note 40, at 909. In further support of this point by way of
analogy, it has been stated that, in conducting present-value analysis under the best-interests
test in Chapter 11, a court must account for the probability of success of the reorganization
plan in addition to the discount rate. Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Does It Matter
How Bankruptcy Judges Evaluate the Creditors’ Best-Interests Test?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.
497, 498, 500–01 (2007). Interestingly, however, because this prescription separates the
discount rate and the likelihood of successful reorganization into distinct analytical concepts,
it suggests that the discount rate ought to be a risk-free rate that accounts only for the time
value of money (i.e., opportunity cost and expected inflation).
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exceed 0.5, it follows that, when rounding to the nearest thousandth, Ps will
have a lower bound of 0.501 and an upper bound of 1.000 (i.e., 0.501 ≤ Ps ≤
1.000). Consequently, the value for Pd in the formula for expected default
costs could range from 0.000 to 0.499, notwithstanding the court’s finding
of financial feasibility.
This "flexible approach" undoubtedly has pragmatic appeal. It gives a
court the flexibility of confirming a plan not guaranteed to succeed, but
nonetheless having reasonable prospects for success. Moreover, the
approach allows a court to mitigate its prediction error by compensating
creditors through the incorporation of a risk factor into the discount rate for
present-value analysis.152 Were courts required to predict with certainty the
successful completion of a Chapter 13 plan, they would likely confirm
fewer Chapter 13 plans, which would result in a higher incidence of
dismissed or converted Chapter 13 cases.153 This would likely deter debtors
from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, thus undermining Congress’s
intent to encourage greater use of the chapter by individual debtors.154
The flexible approach fails to account, however, for a key difference
between the financial-feasibility standards for the confirmation of Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 plans. That difference suggests that a finding of
financial feasibility ought to result in distinct approaches for incorporating
risk of default when conducting present-value analysis under the two
chapters. Whereas the financial-feasibility requirement for confirmation of
a Chapter 13 plan requires a court to find that "the debtor will be able to
make all payments under the plan,"155 the Chapter 11 analogue only
requires a court to find that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be
followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization,
of the debtor . . . , unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in
152. Even under this approach, there will be instances in which the prediction error is
not completely mitigated—specifically, those cases where it is more likely than not that the
debtor’s plan will fail, but the court concludes otherwise. In such cases, the probability of
plan default will be greater than or equal to 0.501. By virtue of its erroneous finding of
financial feasibility, however, the court will not be able to set Pd in the formula for expected
default costs any higher than the upper bound of 0.499. Accordingly, in such cases, the
prediction error will not be mitigated to the extent that the actual probability of plan default
exceeds the predicted probability of plan default.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5) (2006) (providing that a court may convert or dismiss a
Chapter 13 case for cause, including "denial of confirmation of a plan . . . and denial of a
request made for additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan").
154. See 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 233 ("The legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 establishes that Congress sought to promote the use
of Chapter 13 in appropriate cases.").
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
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the plan."156 Because the standard of proof for Chapter 11 plan
confirmation is a preponderance of the evidence, a court need only find that
it is more likely than not that the Chapter 11 plan is not likely to fail.157 A
court required to make a finding of the financial feasibility of a Chapter 11
plan thus faces what can be described as "two more-likely-than-not
assessments,"158 which has significant implications when importing the
flexible approach into the Chapter 11 context.159
As in Chapter 13,160 confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan will generally
require a court to conduct present-value analysis, which is indicated by the
identical language "value, as of the effective date of the plan."161 Assuming
that it is appropriate in Chapter 11 cases to implement the Chapter 13
framework for conducting present-value analysis,162 one would conduct the
analysis by calculating expected default costs. To ascertain expected
default costs, one would have to estimate the probability of default (Pd)
under the Chapter 11 plan. Under the flexible approach, Pd = 1 − Ps, with
Ps representing the probability of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization.
In turn, Ps is derived from the court’s financial-feasibility determination.
As mentioned before, such a determination involves two probability
estimates—specifically, (1) whether it is more likely than not that (2) the
plan is likely to succeed. The first estimate represents the POE standard,
156. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (emphasis added). Similar to the Chapter 13 context, the Code’s
legislative history uses the term "feasibility" to describe the confirmation requirement set
forth in Code § 1129(a)(11). See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 128 (1978) ("Paragraph (11)
requires a determination regarding feasibility of the plan."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5914; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977) ("Paragraph (11) contains the feasibility
standards."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6369. For further discussion regarding
the Chapter 11 feasibility standards, see, for example, Financial Security Assurance Inc. v.
T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership), 116 F.3d 790,
801 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Arts Dairy, LLC, 432 B.R. 712, 716–17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010).
157. See supra note 146 (citing case law supporting the proposition that the standard of
proof for Chapter 11 plan confirmation is preponderance of the evidence).
158. Levmore, supra note 146, at 742.
159. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the presentvalue provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Code).
160. See supra notes 31, 34 and accompanying text (quoting Chapter 13 present-value
provisions).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (a)(9), (a)(15)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (b)(2)(B)(i),
(b)(2)(C)(i); cf. Epstein & Fuller, supra note 40, at 905 ("[B]oth section 1129 of Chapter 11
and section 1325 of Chapter 13 test the adequacy of a plan’s deferred cash payments to the
holder of a secured claim by looking to the ‘value, as of the effective date of the plan’ of the
deferred cash payments.").
162. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the presentvalue provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Bankruptcy Code).
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and the second estimate represents the financial-feasibility requirement.
Unlike the Chapter 13 feasibility requirement, which is framed as a binary
assessment (i.e., whether the debtor will make all payments), the Chapter
11 feasibility requirement is framed as an interval assessment (i.e., the
likelihood of the plan succeeding). Calculating Ps thus presents the issue of
conjunctive probability and implicates use of the "product rule," whereby
the probability associated with the POE standard and the probability
associated with the feasibility standard will be multiplied in order to
calculate the combined likelihood that yields Ps.163
In quantitative terms, the court can make a Chapter 11 feasibility
finding if it is convinced that there is at least a 0.501 probability (again,
rounding to the nearest thousandth) that plan confirmation will not likely be
followed by liquidation or further financial reorganization. The latter
condition can be reclassified and quantified as a finding that, at a minimum,
there exists a 0.501 probability of successful reorganization. Accordingly,
when multiplying the quantified confirmation standard (which could range
from 0.501 to 1.000) by the quantum of proof (which could range from
0.501 to 1.000), a court could make a finding of financial feasibility in the
Chapter 11 context where the predicted probability of plan success ranges
from a lower bound of 0.251 (i.e., a finding of a 0.501 probability of
successful reorganization multiplied by the 0.501 quantum of proof) to an
upper bound of 1.000 (i.e., a finding of a 1.000 probability of successful
reorganization multiplied by a 1.000 quantum of proof). In other words,
0.251 < Ps < 1.000.
Consider the implication of implementing the flexible approach in the
Chapter 11 context. Under that approach, Pd = 1 − Ps. Given the range of
Ps, the value for Pd in the formula for expected default costs could range
from 0.000 to 0.749. The conjunction issue presented by the Chapter 11
feasibility standard gives rise to the possibility that, if one were to
implement the flexible approach, Pd could exceed 0.500 for purposes of
Chapter 11 present-value analysis. More specifically, there would be a
range of cases where 0.501 < Pd < 0.749. For such cases, implementing the
flexible approach would entail use of a discount rate that would compensate
creditors (under a confirmed plan) at a level reflecting plan failure rather
than plan success. Such a result would be demonstrably at odds with the
notion of a confirmed plan as being one that "is not likely to be followed by

163. See Levmore, supra note 146, at 723 (describing application of the "product rule").
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the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the
debtor."164
To avoid this absurd result, a court would have to dispense with
application of the product rule. Once a court was satisfied that the POE
threshold of 0.501 had been met or exceeded, the court would take what
had been proven as a given—specifically, that successful reorganization
was more likely than not (i.e., Ps ≥ 0.501). A finding of financial feasibility
in the Chapter 11 context would thus entail an estimate within the range of
0.501 ≤ Ps ≤ 1.000. This, in turn, would allow for a sensible application of
the flexible approach in Chapter 11 pursuant to which creditors would be
compensated according to a discount rate reflecting successful
reorganization (as a result of 0.000 ≤ Pd ≤ 0.499).
If the flexible approach can be sensibly applied only by taking what
has been proven as a given, then a court that makes a finding of financial
feasibility in the Chapter 13 context must calculate the discount rate for
present-value analysis on the assumption that the "debtor will be able to
make all payments under the plan."165 Under the assumption Pd = 0, there
are no expected default costs (i.e., Ce = 0). It is important to note that this
line of argument does not contradict the proposition that present-value
analysis should be applied consistently across the different Code
chapters.166 The argument offered here began with the idea that the
discount rate can be reframed as a formula for expected default costs.
Although the formula remains constant across Code chapters, Pd is
calculated differently in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 11 by virtue of the
distinct financial-feasibility requirements of the two chapters. Thus, the
expected-default-costs framework can be applied equally in both chapters
while simultaneously recognizing and giving effect to their substantive
differences in confirmation standards.
2. Actual Default Costs (Ca)
Solely on the basis of this contextualized reading of the Code, one
could conclude that the discount rate must be a risk-free rate. For the sake
of argument, however, assume that taking account of the likelihood of plan
failure is appropriate—that is, that a court may confirm a plan
164. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
165. Id. § 1325(a)(6).
166. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the presentvalue provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Bankruptcy Code).
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notwithstanding that Pd > 0 and that the court may factor this into its
present-value analysis. One must still answer whether the amounts
represented by Ca should be factored into present-value analysis. If none of
those factors may be taken into account when calculating the risk-adjusted
discount rate, this would be the equivalent of saying that Ca = 0 in
calculating expected default costs. Under that condition, Ce also equals
zero, thereby yielding a riskless discount rate.
The factors identified by the plurality as producing default costs relate
to (1) the value of the collateral securing the creditor’s allowed secured
claim and (2) presumably the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate
(i.e., the degree to which the sum of the claims against the estate exceed
estate property available for distribution).167 The factors identified by the
dissent as producing default costs relate to (1) the value of the collateral
securing the creditor’s allowed secured claim, (2) the illiquidity of
foreclosed or repossessed collateral, and (3) the enforcement of security
rights in the bankruptcy forum.168 Each of these factors will be considered
in turn, and it will be shown that the Code allows recovery for some of
these costs pursuant to procedures outside the confirmation process and
precludes recovery of the remaining costs.
a. Default Costs Relating to Collateral Value
First, consider default costs relating to the value of the collateral
securing the creditor’s allowed secured claim, a factor identified by both the
plurality and the dissent. According to the plurality opinion, risk
adjustment should be dictated partly by "the nature of the security."169 The
dissenting opinion is more specific than the plurality, identifying "the rate
of collateral depreciation" as a "relevant factor[] bearing on risk
premium."170 Given the plurality’s broader statement, one might reasonably
conclude that concern over the nature of the security includes not only
depreciation, but also destruction or loss of the collateral. When a debtor
167. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) ("The appropriate size of th[e] risk adjustment depends . . . on such factors as the
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the
reorganization plan.").
168. See id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he most relevant factors bearing on risk
premium are (1) the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the
liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of enforcement.").
169. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
170. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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retains property subject to a creditor’s security interest and does so over the
objection of the creditor, the concern arises that, in the event of default, if
the collateral has depreciated or has been destroyed, then the creditor will
be left with a loss that it would not have suffered if it had been allowed to
foreclose on the collateral in the first instance.171
Under such
circumstances, the retention of the lien by the creditor—which the plan
must provide when the debtor exercises the cramdown option172—will be of
little comfort.
Congress, however, well aware of this problem when it drafted the
Code, created a process by which a secured creditor can seek protection
from the loss or declining value of its collateral. Before discussing this
process, it is worth noting how and why the Code interferes with a
creditor’s ability to enforce its security rights. When a debtor files for
bankruptcy, a stay goes into effect automatically (without requiring court
action) that prevents creditors from taking certain actions against the debtor
and its estate.173 The automatic stay plays a fundamental role in protecting
both debtors and creditors: It gives a debtor breathing room,174 and it
"accords procedural relief to creditors in the form of an orderly, collective
process that administers the assets of a debtor to its creditors as a response
to the common pool problem that arises when a debtor has insufficient
assets to repay his or her debts."175 The automatic stay therefore prohibits,
among other acts, any act to obtain possession of estate property and any
act to enforce a lien against estate property.176

171. See id. at 502 ("The first cost of default involves depreciation. If the debtor
defaults, the creditor can eventually repossess and sell the collateral, but by then it may be
substantially less valuable than the remaining balance due—and the debtor may stop paying
long before the creditor receives permission to repossess.").
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
173. See id. § 362(a) (listing acts that are stayed); Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d
106, 113 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Because the automatic stay is exactly what the name implies—
‘automatic’—it operates without the necessity for judicial intervention."); FDIC v. Hirsch
(In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he automatic stay is
imposed by Congressional mandate and not by court order. By its very terms, no action by
any court is necessary for the stay to take effect." (citations omitted)).
174. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297.
175. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts:
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 414
(2005); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49 (1978) (discussing how the automatic stay protects
creditors), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340
(same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (5).
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A creditor may seek relief from the automatic stay, however, if its
interest in estate property is not adequately protected.177 The concept of
adequate protection can be located within the Fifth Amendment and its
protection of property interests, the idea being that a procedure should exist
to ensure that the automatic stay does not unconstitutionally deprive a
creditor’s nonbankruptcy property right to seize collateral pursuant to its
security agreement with the debtor.178 As a matter of policy, the concept of
adequate protection recognizes that giving a secured creditor the absolute
right to its nonbankruptcy entitlement may undermine bankruptcy’s
collective process; accordingly, adequate protection provides a secured
creditor with the equivalent value of its nonbankruptcy entitlement rather
than the entitlement itself.179 The Code provides three methods for
adequately protecting a secured creditor’s interest in collateral that the
debtor retains: (1) providing periodic cash payments to the creditor equal to
the decrease in the value of the creditor’s interest in the collateral;180
(2) granting the creditor an additional lien or substitute lien on other
property equal to the decrease in the value of the creditor’s interest in the
collateral;181 or (3) other protection, other than providing an administrative
expense claim to the creditor, that will result in the creditor realizing the
indubitable equivalent of the value of its interest in the collateral.182
In general terms, a creditor’s interest will be adequately protected only
if the creditor’s allowed secured claim, which is determined by reference to
the value of the collateral securing the claim,183 remains fully secured
throughout the life of the debtor’s repayment plan.184 If this condition
obtains, then the creditor will, at a minimum, be able to realize the amount
it would have received had the creditor been allowed to seize the collateral
and liquidate it on the petition date.185 To see why this is the case, consider
177. Id. § 362(d)(1).
178. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295.
179. Id.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1).
181. Id. § 361(2).
182. Id. § 361(3).
183. See id. § 506(a) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .").
184. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nichols (In re Nichols), 440 F.3d 850, 857 n.6 (6th
Cir. 2006).
185. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases involving an individual debtor, the standard for
valuing collateral that consists of personal property is replacement value. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)(2). This value is obviously higher than liquidation value. Accordingly, when
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the simple dynamic of repayment under the cramdown option. Recall that,
when a debtor invokes the cramdown option, the debtor’s plan must
propose that the creditor retain the lien securing its claim.186 Payments to
the creditor have the effect of reducing the amount of debt outstanding.
The only way that a creditor’s allowed secured claim will become
undersecured is if the rate of decline in the value of the collateral (whether
because of depreciation or loss) exceeds the rate of repayment. Thus, so
long as the rate of repayment exceeds the rate of decline in value, the
creditor’s interest will be adequately protected.187 In the event that the
debtor’s plan fails, and the case is either converted to Chapter 7 or
dismissed, the outstanding debt owed on the allowed secured claim will be
fully covered by the value of the collateral as a result of the retained lien,188
thereby permitting complete recovery by the creditor.
Given that the Code has an independent process for adequately
protecting a creditor’s interest in collateral, any discount rate that
compensates for expected default costs related to a decline in collateral
value is inappropriate. An amendment in 2005 to the Chapter 13
confirmation standards further confirms this.189
Pursuant to that
determining whether the present value of the proposed income payments under the Chapter
13 cramdown option is equal to the allowed amount of a claim secured by personal property,
the latter amount will be greater than what the creditor would have received through
liquidation of the collateral at a foreclosure sale, since the allowed amount of the secured
claim will be determined by reference to the replacement value of the collateral. Infra note
269 and accompanying text. Thus, if the allowed secured claim has remained fully secured
and the debtor has made some payments under the plan prior to default, it is highly likely
that the creditor will have received more than it would have received upon immediate
foreclosure (i.e., the surplus represented by the difference between the plan payments
actually made under a replacement-value standard and what those payments would have
been under a liquidation-value standard).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(i).
187. If the rate of decline in collateral value exceeds the rate of repayment required by
the cramdown option, a debtor would be able to use the options provided in the Code’s
adequate protection provision to rectify the situation. For example, the debtor could increase
the amount of periodic payments in order to offset the rate of depreciation. Id. § 361(1).
Alternatively, the debtor could give the creditor an additional or substitute lien on property
whose value is determined not to decline during the life of the plan. Id. § 362(2).
188. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(II) (requiring Chapter 13 plan to provide that, upon
dismissal or conversion of the case prior to completion of the plan, the secured creditor will
retain its lien to the extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law). A lien generally
passes through bankruptcy unaffected. Id. § 506(d); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417
(1992); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313.
The Bankruptcy Code does provide mechanisms for lien avoidance, none of which is
relevant to discussion here. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 544–548.
189. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
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amendment, when a debtor invokes the cramdown option with respect to a
creditor whose claim is secured by personal property and to whom the
debtor proposes to make periodic payments, the Code now provides that
"the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to
provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of
the plan."190 The amendment makes it quite clear that adequate-protection
concerns are to be addressed distinctly from present-value analysis.191
Thus, expected default costs related to declining collateral value should not
be incorporated into the discount rate used for such analysis.192
b. Default Costs Relating to Estate Insolvency
Second, consider default costs relating to the degree of insolvency of
the debtor’s estate (i.e., the degree to which the sum of the claims against
the estate exceeds estate property available for distribution). Presumably,
this is what the plurality opinion refers to when it states that "the
circumstances of the estate" are a relevant factor in making an upward
adjustment to the discount rate used in present-value analysis.193 This
should not be a concern for creditors who have allowed secured claims. By
virtue of their liens on property of the estate, that property (i.e., the
collateral securing the claim) serves as a form of insurance against
nonpayment.194 To the extent such creditors are concerned about the
declining value of their collateral, they can demand adequate protection of
their interests in the property. Because secured creditors have first claim to
109-8, § 309(c)(1)(C), 119 Stat. 23, 83 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) (2006)).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
191. Indeed, Justice Stevens argued in his dissenting opinion in Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash that the loss of collateral value in a Chapter 13 case ought to be mitigated by
adequate-protection payments and not present-value-interest payments. Assocs. Commercial
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 966 n.* (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This makes all the
more perplexing his reference in Till to the "nature of the security" as a relevant
consideration in determining the risk adjustment to the discount rate used for present-value
analysis. Supra note 169 and accompanying text.
192. On this account, Justice Scalia’s focus on the expected default cost resulting from
the depreciation in the value of collateral is misguided. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S.
465, 502 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
194. See In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) ("[I]n case of
default, the creditor can recover the remaining value of his claim by securing and disposing
of the collateral."), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re
Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997).
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the estate assets in which they have an interest, they theoretically need not
be concerned with the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate.195
Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, would rightfully be concerned
about the estate’s insolvency in the event of plan default. Recall, however,
that the Chapter 13 confirmation standard for allowed unsecured claims
focuses on whether the proposed distributions on account of such claims
have a present value equal to the amount of property that would be
distributed to such claims in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.196 Given
that general unsecured claims in Chapter 7 receive a pro-rata distribution of
nonexempt estate property remaining after payment to priority unsecured
claims,197 it would be quite misguided to compensate general unsecured
creditors in Chapter 13 for the loss which they would otherwise experience
in Chapter 7.198 In light of these considerations, default costs relating to the
degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate should not be incorporated if
calculating a risk-adjusted discount rate.
c. Default Costs Relating to Collateral Illiquidity
Third, consider default costs relating to the illiquidity of foreclosed or
repossessed collateral. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that, in the
event of default, a creditor would not be able to recover the replacement
195. I say theoretically because of the possibility that, in the event the court determines
that a creditor is entitled to adequate protection, that protection could prove to be
inadequate—that is, the creditor’s allowed secured claim may end up undersecured because
of a deficiency in the protection given to the creditor. When this occurs, the Code provides
that the creditor will be allowed an administrative expense claim against the estate with
priority over all other administrative expense claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b). If the debtor’s
plan fails and the case is converted to Chapter 7, the Chapter 7 administrative expense
claims will be paid before the Chapter 13 administrative expense claims. Id. § 726(b). If the
debtor’s Chapter 7 estate is administratively insolvent, or if there are insufficient assets to
pay the Chapter 13 administrative expense claims in full, the creditor will suffer a loss that it
would not have suffered had the creditor been able to foreclose on its collateral when the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. Under this limited set of circumstances, a creditor would be
concerned over the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate. Nonetheless, this is an
adequate-protection issue and thus not properly considered in the vein of present-value
analysis. Supra Part III.B.2.a.
196. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing application of presentvalue analysis with respect to allowed unsecured claims).
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a), (b) (specifying the order in which claims will be paid in
Chapter 7 and requiring that payment be made on a pro rata basis).
198. In fact, when Congress has desired to increase the distributions to general
unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 over and above the amounts they would receive in Chapter
7, it has expressly drafted Code provisions to this effect. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
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value to which it is entitled in Chapter 13 when a debtor invokes the
cramdown option.199 Instead, the creditor would receive "only a lesser
foreclosure value because collateral markets are not perfectly liquid, and
there is thus a spread between what a buyer will pay and what a seller will
demand."200 In the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,201 Congress
clearly expressed its view that this is an expected default cost for which a
secured creditor should not be compensated in bankruptcy. Pursuant to
those amendments, in an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case,
the current standard for valuing collateral that consists of personal property
is replacement value,202 a value that is obviously higher than liquidation
value. Consider the implications of this valuation standard for creditor
repayment in Chapter 7.
Imagine a creditor has an allowed claim of $10,000 that is secured by
property with a replacement value of $10,000 and a foreclosure value of
$8,000. The trustee will abandon such property given both its burden to the
estate as well as its inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.203 Once
such property is abandoned and is no longer part of the estate, the automatic
stay will no longer prohibit the creditor from enforcing its lien against the
property.204 When the creditor forecloses, it will realize only $8,000,
thereby suffering a loss of $2,000. The Code, however, will not entitle the
creditor to recover this loss. Because the creditor will have been deemed to

199. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 502 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 502–03.
201. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 327, 119 Stat. 23, 99–100 (providing that, in an individual debtor’s Chapter 7
or Chatper 13 case, "value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim shall
be determined based on the replacement value of such property") (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)(2) (2006)).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).
203. See id. § 554(a) (authorizing a trustee to abandon any property that is burdensome
or of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate). A Chapter 7 trustee is accountable for
all property received. Id. § 704(a)(2). As such, the estate will incur administrative costs in
preserving the property (i.e., a burden). See id. § 330(a)(1)(B) (providing that a court may
award to a trustee "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses"); id. § 503(b)(2)
(providing that reimbursement awarded under Code § 330(a) constitutes an administrative
expense). The property, however, will generally not provide any value or benefit to the
estate because the allowed amount of the creditor’s claim consumes the entire value of the
property to which the creditor has first claim. Id. §§ 506(a)(1), 725. In other words, the
property will not provide any value for distribution to the unsecured creditors. Under these
circumstances, the trustee will abandon the property.
204. See id. § 362(c)(1) ("[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate . . .
continues until such property is no longer property of the estate.").
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have had an allowed claim that was fully secured,205 the creditor will not
have an unsecured claim entitling it to participate in distribution of
nonexempt estate property to the holders of allowed unsecured claims.206
Accordingly, if the Code precludes in Chapter 7 cases the recovery of
expected default costs relating to the illiquidity of foreclosed or repossessed
collateral, there is no principled reason to account for such costs were one
to calculate a risk-adjusted discount rate.
d. Default Costs Relating to Enforcement Actions
Finally, consider default costs relating to the enforcement of a
creditor’s security rights in the bankruptcy forum. Justice Scalia described
the problem as follows:
The third cost of default consists of the administrative expenses of
foreclosure. While a Chapter 13 plan is in effect, the automatic stay
prevents secured creditors from repossessing their collateral, even if the
debtor fails to pay. The creditor’s attorney must move the bankruptcy
court to lift the stay. . . . Moreover, bankruptcy judges will often excuse
first offenses, so foreclosure may require multiple trips to court. The
total expected administrative expenses in the event of default could
reasonably be estimated at $600 or more.207

Yet again, here is another instance in which the Code allows recovery
for this type of expected default cost pursuant to a procedure outside of the
confirmation process—specifically, the claim-allowance process. The
definition of claim includes a contingent right to payment,208 and only
creditors (i.e., entities with a pre-petition claim against the debtor)209 may
file proofs of claim.210 Moreover, a claim cannot be disallowed merely
because it is contingent.211 Finally, the Code authorizes a court to estimate

205. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (explaining the manner in which the
secured status of an allowed claim is determined).
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (establishing the order of distribution of estate property to
unsecured creditors in Chapter 7 cases).
207. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 503 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).
209. See id. § 101(10)(A) (defining creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor"). For a
discussion of the terms "pre-petition" and "post-petition," see infra note 245.
210. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a).
211. Id. § 502(b)(1).
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for claim-allowance purposes "any contingent . . . claim, the fixing . . . of
which . . . would unduly delay the administration of the case."212
With these principles in mind, it should become clear that a creditor
ought to be able to recover expected default costs relating to the
administrative expenses of foreclosure through the claim-allowance
process. Security agreements routinely provide that a creditor may recover
collection costs incurred in enforcing the agreement.213 If carefully drafted,
such a provision could include collection costs incurred while enforcing the
agreement in the bankruptcy forum. Pursuant to that agreement, the
creditor would have a pre-petition contingent right to recover collection
costs in the bankruptcy forum.214 Accordingly, expected default costs
arising from the administrative expenses of foreclosure should be recovered
as part of a creditor’s allowed claim (i.e., the confirmation threshold for
evaluating present-value analysis)215 rather than being incorporated into a
risk-adjusted discount calculus.216
As the foregoing reveals, none of the factors identified by the plurality
and dissent as producing expected default costs should be incorporated into
the discount rate used for present-value analysis.217 In other words, a
212. Id. § 502(c)(1).
213. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 159 (6th ed. 2009).
214. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 453–
54 (2006) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code provision governing the allowance of claims
does not prohibit an unsecured creditor from recovering attorneys’ fees authorized by a prepetition contract and incurred in post-petition litigation).
215. See supra Part II.A (explaining the Chapter 13 confirmation threshold for secured
and unsecured claims).
216. The Court in Travelers did not address whether Code § 506(b) categorically
disallows unsecured claims for contractual attorneys’ fees that arise under a pre-petition
contract but are incurred post-petition. Travelers, 549 U.S. at 454–56; see also infra Part
IV.B.1 (discussing Code § 506(b)). For the argument that Code § 506(b) does not disallow
such claims, see, for example, Insurance Administrators, Inc. v. SNTL Corp. (In re SNTL
Corp.), 380 B.R. 204, 218–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. SNTL Corp. v. Centre
Insurance Co., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2009); Qmect, Inc. v. Burlingame Capital Partners (In
re Qmect, Inc.), 368 B.R. 882, 885–86 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007). For the argument that Code
§ 506(b) does disallow such claims, see, for example, Mark S. Scarberry, Interpreting
Bankruptcy Code Sections 502 and 506: Post-Petition Attorneys’ Fees in a Post-Travelers
World, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 611, 615 (2007). If the argument that such claims are
disallowed is correct, then this further bolsters the conclusion that expected default costs
relating to the enforcement of security rights in the bankruptcy court should not be
incorporated into a risk-adjusted discount-rate calculus. If the Code generally precludes the
recovery of such costs from the estate, there is no principled reason to allow their recovery
in Chapter 13.
217. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text (discussing factors identified by
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contextual reading of the Code reveals that none of the amounts represented
by Ca should be taken into account when calculating a risk premium for the
present-value discount rate. This is the equivalent of Ca = 0. Thus, even if
risk of default is a relevant factor such that one may account for the
possibility that Pd > 0, the expected costs of default will nonetheless equal
zero for purposes of calculating an appropriate discount rate. Under either
view (i.e., Pd = 0 or Ca = 0), the discount rate should be risk free rather than
risk adjusted.
C. A Discount Rate That Accounts Only for Expected Inflation
Given that the Code compels use of a risk-free discount rate for
present-value analysis, what about the Code further requires that the rate
not include compensation for opportunity cost? Here, the answer lies in the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of a secured creditor’s interest
in collateral that must be adequately protected. Recall that a creditor may
seek relief from the automatic stay on the basis of "lack of adequate
protection of [the creditor’s] interest in property."218 In United Savings
Bank Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,219 the Court
unanimously held that the term "interest in property" does not include the
foregone investment opportunity that results when the automatic stay
prohibits immediate foreclosure and sale of the collateral securing the
creditor’s claim.220 In other words, the Code prohibits compensation for
opportunity cost. On this account, a discount rate for purposes of presentvalue analysis should not seek to compensate the creditor for such cost.
Prior to Till, at least one bankruptcy court, relying upon the Court’s
decision in Timbers, took the view that the discount rate used for presentvalue analysis should not compensate a creditor for opportunity cost. In In
re Collins,221 which involved a dispute over the appropriate discount rate to
be applied in a Chapter 13 cramdown,222 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Texas made the following observation:
the plurality and dissent in Till that would produce expected default costs).
218. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2006). For further discussion on the topic of adequate
protection, see supra Part III.B.2.a.
219. United Savings Bank Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484
U.S. 365 (1988).
220. Id. at 370–71, 82.
221. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994), abrogated by Green Tree
Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997).
222. Id. at 843–44.
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The Timbers case is significant because the concept of adequate
protection is closely analogous to the present value debate. In Timbers,
adequate protection was held not to encompass the prevention of lost
opportunity costs on behalf of a creditor. This Court views present value
analysis in much the same way. What § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) attempts to
remedy is the loss in value of money due solely to the passage of time
much as a cost of living adjustment to an employee’s wage protects
against inflation. Put simply, the concepts of present value and adequate
protection are the same, they serve to protect the status quo.223

In this statement, one witnesses that the Collins court conceptualized the
time-value-of-money component of the discount rate merely as a function of
expected inflation rather than expected inflation and opportunity cost. With
an inflationary risk-free rate as a base rate, the Collins court adopted a
methodology similar to the Till plurality’s formula approach—specifically, an
upward adjustment to the base rate, which the Collins court described as "an
additional risk factor of interest . . . based on the relevant considerations of
the case."224 Although the Collins court acknowledged the inherent risk of
plan failure in its discussion of the adjustment to the inflationary base rate,225
the court clearly conceived of the adjustment as one intended to compensate a
creditor for administrative and transaction costs rather than for the risk of
nonpayment.226 Thus, in describing the proper methodology for calculating
the present-value discount rate, "risk factor" appears to have been a
misnomer, making the Collins court’s repeated references to the term
unfortunately misleading.227
At bottom, Collins stands for the proposition that the present-value
discount rate ought to be an inflation rate that can potentially be adjusted to
compensate for administrative costs. Here, then, is an example of a pre-Till
decision that conceptualized the discount rate as one that ought to
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 845–46.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
See id. at 847 n.7 ("[T]he enhancement above a risk-free discount factor is more in

the nature of an extra payment to compensate the creditor for administration and transaction
costs rather than to compensate him for the possibility of default in the scheduled plan
payments."). In rejecting the coerced-loan approach, the Till plurality deemed the recovery
of transaction costs through the present-value discount rate to be inappropriate. Till v. SCS
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). And, as argued
above, compensation for such costs should occur pursuant to other Code procedures. Supra
notes 207–16 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g. , In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 846, 847 & nn.7–8 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994)
(making repeated references to the term "risk factor"), abrogated by Green Tree Fin.
Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997).
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compensate for the risk of inflation, but not risk of nonpayment or
opportunity cost.228 Granted, the Collins decision was subsequently
abrogated by the Fifth Circuit.229 But the important takeaway is that a
bankruptcy court recognized the relevance of the Court’s precedent in
Timbers for purposes of conducting present-value analysis, a precedent
whose implications the Court failed to appreciate when deciding Till.230
It may be argued that reliance on Timbers is an insufficient basis to
exclude compensation for opportunity cost from the present-value calculus.
After all, that opportunity cost is not an "interest in property" that must be
protected does not mean that opportunity cost should not be recovered in
another context. In other words, it could plausibly constitute a component
of the discount rate notwithstanding the Court’s views on adequateprotection compensation. But even if one accepts the argument that
Timbers is inapposite for purposes of present-value analysis, courts have
repeatedly declined to compensate creditors for opportunity cost when they
have asserted their entitlement thereto on the basis that such cost should be
allowed as an administrative expense constituting an actual, necessary cost
and expense of preserving the debtor’s estate.231 Accordingly, using the
228. In this regard, Rasmussen goes too far in his assertion that "Justice Thomas came
up with an argument . . . adopted by no court." Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 326.
229. Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211
(5th Cir. 1997), overruled by Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, it is clear that, prior to Till, at least one court had concluded that the presentvalue discount rate should not compensate for default risk.
230. This failure is perhaps not that surprising. The Court is generally viewed to lack
competence in deciding bankruptcy cases. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 105, 116. The lack
of competence may flow from "the tendency of the Supreme Court to use the Bankruptcy
Code as a laboratory for strict statutory construction." Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious
Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code:
Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 215
(2000). This tendency has had the effect of foreclosing a "pragmatic and contextual
approach to interpretation of the Code." Id. at 214. And, of course, the Justices generally
lack expertise in bankruptcy. For evidence that specialization (among other factors)
produces better decision-making in the bankruptcy context, see Jonathan R. Nash & Rafael I.
Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of
Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1803–06 (2008).
231. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 868 (4th Cir. 1994); In re
Plunkett, 191 B.R. 768, 780–81 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995). The Code permits an entity to file
a request for payment of an administrative expense. 11 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2006). An
administrative expense can include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate." Id. § 503(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to the benefit-to-the-estate test, a debt will qualify
as an actual, necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate "if (1) it arose from a
transaction with the bankruptcy estate and (2) directly and substantially benefitted the
estate." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Sunarhauserman, Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.),
126 F.3d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, such administrative expenses are limited to
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discount rate as a sub-rosa mechanism for the recovery of opportunity cost
would impermissibly end-run the Code’s primary procedure governing
creditor compensation for postbankruptcy liabilities.
Once one eliminates the components of opportunity cost and risk of
nonpayment from an interest rate, all that remains is the component that
accounts for expected inflation.232 Accordingly, the discount rate used for
present-value analysis should be the equivalent of an inflation rate.233
Pursuant to this interpretation of the Code, Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion did not go far enough. Using the prime rate as the discount rate, as
Justice Thomas suggested,234 would overcompensate creditors in Chapter
13. Even the most creditworthy borrowers default and get charged
accordingly when borrowing. In other words, the prime rate is not a
riskless rate.235 It is also a rate that takes into account opportunity cost.236
How, then, should a court estimate expected inflation so as to arrive at
the appropriate discount rate for calculating present value in Chapter 13?
One approach would be (1) to start with the current interest rate on a
Treasury note with a maturity date roughly equivalent to the Chapter 13
debts for which the acts giving rise to the liability occurred subsequent to the debtor’s
bankruptcy filing. Id. at 817–19.
232. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary
components of a traditional interest rate).
233. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether its positive theory of
present-value analysis in Chapter 13 ought to be equally applicable in Chapter 11. On the
one hand, the language of various Code provisions that require present-value analysis is
similar. Compare, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring that a nonconsenting holder
of an impaired claim "receive or retain under the plan . . . property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive
or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . on such date"), with id.
§ 1325(a)(4) (requiring for Chapter 13 plan confirmation that, with respect to the holder of
an allowed unsecured claim, the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed . . . is not less than the amount that would be paid . . . if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7"). This may justify a uniform approach. Supra note 40. If,
however, one takes into account contextual differences, such as the differences in the
financial-feasibility provisions of Chapters 11 and 13, such differences may justify
incorporating an adjustment for default risk when conducting present-value analysis in
Chapter 11 cases. Supra Part III.B.1. For a discussion of the applicability of Till in Chapter
11 cases see, for example, Gary W. Marsh & Matthew M. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates
After Till, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209, 212–30 (2010).
234. Supra note 80 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion); see also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d 874,
875 (7th Cir. 1996).
236. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary
components of a traditional interest rate).

164

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 113 (2011)

plan’s duration (a period that cannot exceed five years237),238 and (2) to
subtract from the interest rate the real rate for the riskless cost of capital,239
which has been estimated to be two percent.240 This figure will produce an
estimated inflation rate that can be used as a riskless discount rate that does
not account for opportunity cost.
IV. The Recovery of Interest in Bankruptcy
In further support of the argument for an inflationary discount rate, this
Part illuminates a critical dimension to the present-value debate that has
heretofore been ignored in the literature. In debating what discount rate
ought to be applied in bankruptcy, courts and commentators on all sides of
the debate have assumed that, as a descriptive matter, the core components
of a discount rate applied in bankruptcy do not substantively differ from
discount rates that are applied to financial flows outside of bankruptcy.
Mechanically importing nonbankruptcy discount rates into the bankruptcy
context, however, overlooks the fact that bankruptcy law’s response to a
common-pool problem241 presents a set of analytically distinct
237. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1329(c) (providing that a Chapter 13 plan cannot
exceed a repayment period of five years and that the five-year limitation applies to a postconfirmation modified plan).
238. The idea of using a Treasury-note rate as the starting point for the discount-rate
calculus is not a novel one. For example, in a pre-Till decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the discount rate used for present-value analysis in the
Chapter 13 cramdown context "should be fixed at the rate on a United States Treasury
instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtor’s
reorganization plan" and further observed that, "[b]ecause the rate on a treasury bond is
virtually risk free, the § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) interest rate should also include a premium to
reflect the risk to the creditor in receiving deferred payments under the reorganization plan."
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997),
abrogated by Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
239. The current interest rate on a government bond is a nominal rate that "includes
expected inflation and the real cost of capital." POSNER, supra note 49, at 195 & n.11; see
also In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that
Treasury rate "reflects two of the three components of a market interest rate—expected
inflation, and ‘real’ interest"), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541
U.S. 465 (2004). Accordingly, the inflation rate is the nominal rate minus the real rate.
240. POSNER, supra note 49, at 195; see also Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
941, 979 (1999) ("In recent years, the economics literature has generally called for the use of
a real discount rate of 2–3%.").
241. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 16–17
(1986) ("The single most fruitful way to think about bankruptcy is to see it as ameliorating a
common pool problem created by a system of individual creditor remedies.").
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considerations that demands a unique discount-rate calculus. The standard
approach has been to conceptualize the discounting process as the payment
of a traditional interest rate—that is, a rate that compensates for opportunity
cost, expected inflation, and risk of default.242 While such compensation
may be the appropriate treatment of discounting in the nonbankruptcy
context, it does not follow, a fortiori, that a bankruptcy discount rate should
be equally compensatory.
The Bankruptcy Code strictly limits the instances in which a creditor
243
may recover interest as part of its claim against the debtor’s estate.
Once
one recognizes that the Code has been quite explicit where interest recovery
is warranted, and that the discounting process mandated by the Code is not
articulated as the recovery of interest, it follows that wholesale
incorporation of interest-rate components into a bankruptcy discount rate
cannot be justified without statutory directive. In order to support this
claim, Part IV.A sets forth the manner in which the Code generally
excludes the recovery of interest as part of a creditor’s claim. Part IV.B
then identifies the few instances in which the Code provides exceptions to
this general rule. This Section thus bolsters the arguments in Part III for
why discounting cash flows in consumer bankruptcy cases ought to be
conceptually different from the discounting of nonbankruptcy cash flows.
A. The Nominal Amount of Allowed Claims
A creditor in bankruptcy faces two pressing questions: "How do I get
paid?" and "How much will I get paid?" The answer to the first question
addresses the process by which a creditor may establish a claim for
repayment from the debtor’s estate. The answer to the second question is a
function of (1) the amount of property available for distribution to creditors
on account of their claims, and (2) the order of claim repayment based on
the priority of the competing claims against the debtor’s estate. Thus, claim
repayment generally involves determination of the debtor’s liabilities and
distribution of the debtor’s property on account of those liabilities.
The Code broadly defines a claim as a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
242. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary
components of a traditional interest rate).
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2006) (providing general rule that a claim will be
disallowed "to the extent that . . . such claim is for unmatured interest").
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secured, or unsecured."244 Notwithstanding this broad definition, the
Code generally circumscribes repayment to those creditors whose right
to payment arose pre-petition (i.e., prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy
filing).245 Only a creditor may file a proof of claim,246 and the Code
defines a creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that
arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor."247 Given that the commencement of a voluntary case
constitutes an order for relief,248 and given that the filing of a petition
commences a bankruptcy case,249 claim repayment in bankruptcy
primarily focuses on sorting out a debtor’s prebankruptcy liabilities.250
Once a creditor has ascertained that it has a claim against the
debtor, the allowance of the claim must be addressed given that
distributions from a debtor’s estate are made to allowed claims.251
Absent objection by a party in interest, the filing of a proof of claim
creates a presumption of its allowance—a presumption that extends both
244. Id. § 101(5)(A).
245. A debtor voluntarily commences a bankruptcy case by filing a petition. Id.
§ 301(a). Accordingly, it is common to describe the period of time leading up to the filing of
a bankruptcy petition as "pre-petition" and the period of time following the filing of the
petition as "post-petition."
246. Id. § 501(a). If a creditor fails to file a proof of claim, the possibility exists that
others may file the claim on the creditor’s behalf. Id. § 501(b), (c).
247. Id. § 101(10).
248. Id. § 301(b).
249. Supra note 245.
250. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 34 ("Bankruptcy law should determine who are
owners of the [debtor’s] assets, in the sense of having rights against them, at the moment the
bankruptcy petition is filed."). There are certain instances in which the Code treats a postpetition claim as a pre-petition claim. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502(g), (h), (i); id. § 1305(a), (b).
Additionally, entities who incur expenses in connection with the administration of a debtor’s
estate may seek repayment of their administrative expenses from the estate. Id. § 503(a).
The court may allow such administrative expenses. Id. § 503(b). If they are allowed, the
expenses will be granted priority status, and the entity will be allowed to obtain repayment
from the debtor’s estate on account of the priority status of the expense. Id. §§ 507(a)(2),
726(a)(1), 1322(a)(2). Interestingly, the Code provisions from Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
pursuant to which an entity with an administrative expense would seek repayment from the
debtor’s estate reference distribution only to claims entitled to priority under Code § 507.
Id. §§ 726(a)(1), 1322(a)(2). Although a claim entitled to priority under Code § 507(a) is
distinct from an expense entitled to priority under that section, administrative expense
claimants routinely participate in distribution of property from the debtor’s estate. The
logical conclusion must be that Congress inadvertently failed to reference the term
"expenses" in Code §§ 726 and 1322.
251. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a), 1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5) (providing for
distribution to various types of allowed claims).
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to the validity and amount of the claim.252 In the event of an objection,
the court will be called upon to determine the amount of the claim as of
the petition date.253 Various grounds exist for lodging an objection to a
creditor’s claim for repayment.254 Critical for purposes of this Article’s
positive theory of present-value analysis is the extent to which the
Bankruptcy Code allows repayment of unmatured claims.
As previously mentioned, the Code’s definition of claim includes
any unmatured right to payment.255 Accordingly, unless the Code
provides a basis for disallowing an unmatured right to payment, a
creditor’s claim for such an amount will be allowed. The Code
generally does not allow objection to a claim on the basis that the claim
is unmatured.256 The stark exception to this rule is that, to the extent a
claim is for unmatured interest, the claim will be disallowed.257 From
these two rules emerges the proposition that "bankruptcy operates as the
acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor."258
Accordingly, the Code establishes a simple baseline for the nominal
amount a creditor may seek to recover in bankruptcy (the "nominalamount baseline"):
all principal amounts, whether matured or

252. See id. § 502(a) ("A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of
this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects."); FED. R. BANKR. P.
3001(f) ("A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim."). For a discussion of how the
Code’s broad definition of "claim" and the presumption regarding claim allowance facilitate
the expeditious and efficient resolution of creditor claims against the debtor, see Rafael I.
Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge
Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 185–87 (2009).
253. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (providing that, upon objection to a claim, "the court . . .
shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition").
254. Id. § 502(b)(1)–(9).
255. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the Code’s definition of
"claim").
256. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (providing for disallowance of a claim to the extent
"such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or
unmatured" (emphasis added)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 62 (1978) (stating that
"[a]ll . . . unmatured claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy court in order to afford the
debtor complete bankruptcy relief"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848; H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 352 (1977) (same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308.
257. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
258. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849; H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 353, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309.
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unmatured,259 and all amounts for matured interest;260 but not amounts
for unmatured interest.261
B. Deviations from the Nominal-Amount Baseline
The nominal-amount baseline for claim repayment is critically
important because it establishes the backdrop against which to evaluate the
manner in which the Code may alter the baseline in specific contexts. The
Code section regarding claim allowance is a section of general
applicability, one that will have uniform application regardless of the
operative Code chapter under which a debtor files for relief (e.g., Chapter 7
or Chapter 13).262 Put another way, unless a contrary Code section
supplements or displaces the principles encapsulated in the nominal-amount
baseline, that baseline dictates the amount of repayment that may be
demanded by a creditor in bankruptcy.263
259. For purposes of simplicity, the nominal-amount baseline set forth in this Article
applies to garden-variety claims and ignores special instances in which particular claims for
either matured or unmatured principal amounts will be disallowed. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b)(3), (b)(5).
260. See id. (providing that the definition of claim includes a matured right to
payment); id. § 502(b)(2) (listing grounds for disallowance of claim and making no
reference to matured interest); see also 124 CONG. REC. 32,401 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards) ("The House amendment deletes a provision following Section 726(a)(6) of the
Senate amendment providing that the term ‘claim’ includes interest due owed before the date
of the filing of the petition as unnecessary since a right to payment for interest due is a right
to payment which is within the definition of ‘claim’ . . . ."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6459.
261. See United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Section 502(b)
does not simply prohibit certain creditors from filing a proof of claim for post-petition
interest; it prohibits those creditors from collecting the interest from the bankruptcy estate.").
262. Code § 502, which governs the allowance of claims, is set forth in Chapter 5 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a chapter whose provisions apply throughout the Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(a); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 28, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5814; H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 316, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273.
263. This approach in setting forth a positivist account of claim repayment in
bankruptcy is consistent with the manner in which the Supreme Court has sought to interpret
the Bankruptcy Code. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Inc.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). In Timbers, the Court stated the following:
Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that
makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court’s opinion in Timbers was the first majority opinion in a
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If deviations from the nominal-amount baseline are to be properly
understood, it becomes necessary to deconstruct what disallowance of
unmatured interest entails. The interest a creditor charges a debtor
primarily consists of three components: (1) opportunity cost, (2) a premium
for risk of default, and (3) a premium for expected inflation.264 In light of
this, disallowance of unmatured interest as part of a creditor’s claim
generally translates into exclusion from the nominal-amount baseline of
unmatured amounts relating to opportunity cost, risk of default, and
expected inflation. Without a Code section that states otherwise, these are
liabilities for which estate property will not be held accountable.
The question arises as to when, if ever, the Code deviates from the
nominal-amount baseline. Only five Code sections—Code §§ 506(b),
362(d)(3)(B)(ii), 726(a)(5), 1222(b)(11), and 1322(b)(10)—authorize, in a
formalistic sense, the payment of unmatured interest to a creditor.265 As a
bankruptcy case authored by Justice Scalia, an opinion that was unanimous. Morrison,
supra note 49, at 41.
264. See supra note 49 (discussing the three primary components of a traditional
interest rate).
265. While the Code’s present-value-analysis provisions may be characterized as
essentially authorizing the payment of interest, it will become clear from the discussion that
follows that such a characterization is imprecise and obfuscates analysis of the nominalamount baseline and clear deviations therefrom. See supra Part III.A (discussing Chapter 13
present-value-analysis provisions). For this reason, the Article excludes these additional
provisions from the group of Code sections that formalistically authorize the recovery of
interest by a creditor.
There is another provision that arguably should be included within the group of Code
sections authorizing deviation from the nominal-amount baseline. Code § 101(14A) defines
the term "domestic support obligation," in relevant part, as "a debt that accrues before, on, or
after the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, including interest that accrues
on that debt as provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law notwithstanding any other
provision of this title."
11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (emphasis added).
The phrase
"notwithstanding any other provision of this title" possibly suggests that the specific
definition of "domestic support obligation" ought to trump the rules for claim allowance set
forth in Code § 502, a provision of general applicability. See Busic v. United States, 446
U.S. 398, 406 (1980) ("[A] more specific statute will be given precedence over a more
general one, regardless of their temporal sequence."); supra note 262 (discussing the general
applicability of Code § 502). On this view (the "primacy view"), the general rule that a
claim will not be allowed to the extent it is for unmatured interest would be trumped by the
directive that a debt constituting a domestic support obligation is to include unmatured
interest. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). But if that is true, then one would have to accept that the
definition also trumps the rule set forth in Code § 502(b)(5), which disallows a claim to the
extent that it is an unmatured domestic support obligation. Id. §§ 502(b)(5), 523(a)(5).
Accordingly, the primacy view would render Code § 502(b)(5) a nullity. If Congress had
intended that result, however, the logical approach would have been to repeal Code
§ 502(b)(5). Because it did not, one might conclude that Congress did not intend the
definition for domestic support obligation to supplant the rules governing claim allowance
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descriptive matter, these sections can be categorized according to two
attributes (the "baseline-deviation attributes"): (1) whether the section has
been expressly framed as one regarding the allowance of interest, and
(2) whether the section is set forth in a chapter of general applicability. The
first criterion signifies express recognition by the Code that a creditor’s
claim can be augmented to include unmatured interest, thereby increasing
the nominal amount of the claim. This will have implications for the
treatment that may be afforded to the claim by other Code sections
centering on the allowed amount of a claim, such as the Chapter 13
confirmation thresholds for claim repayment.266 The second criterion
signifies the policy choice to allow recovery of interest regardless of
context (e.g., liquidation under Chapter 7 or rehabilitation under Chapter
13).267 When considered jointly, these criteria provide a metric against
which to evaluate the Code’s statutory design for the recovery of interest.
1. Allowance of Accrued Post-Petition Interest on
Oversecured Pre-Petition Claims—Code § 506(b)
The first section authorizing payment of unmatured interest to a
creditor satisfies both of the baseline-deviation attributes—that is, the
section is expressly framed in terms of the allowance of interest and is set
forth in a chapter of general applicability. Code § 506(b) provides that,
(the "nonprimacy view"). Instead, Congress may have included the phrase "notwithstanding
any other provision of this title" to clarify that one must account for a debtor’s accrued and
unaccrued liability for a domestic support obligation when considering the scope of a
debtor’s substantive entitlements under the Code, even though such unaccrued liability is to
be ignored for purposes of claim repayment through the bankruptcy process. See, e.g., id.
§ 362(b)(2)(B) (providing that the automatic stay does not prohibit collection of a domestic
support obligation from the debtor’s property); id. § 522(c)(1) (providing that a debtor’s
exempt property remains liable during or after the bankruptcy case for any debt that is a
domestic support obligation).
This Article considers the nonprimacy view to produce a more coherent and pragmatic
interpretation to the Code. As such, the definitional provision for domestic support
obligation is not included within the group of Code sections authorizing deviation from the
nominal-amount baseline. For a decision that directly supports the nonprimacy view, see In
re Hernandez, No. 07-40470-R, 2007 WL 3998301, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Nov. 15,
2007). For a decision that indirectly supports the primacy view, but fails to discuss the
general rules for claim allowance, see In re Reid, No. 06-50147, 2006 WL 2077572, at *1–2
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. July 19, 2006).
266. See supra Part II.A (discussing Chapter 13 confirmation thresholds).
267. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
under which deviation from the nominal-amount baseline for claim repayment is permitted).
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"[t]o the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the
value of which, after any recovery under [§ 506(c)], is greater than the
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim."268 The Code specifies that the nominal amount of
an allowed secured claim is calculated by comparing (1) the amount of the
allowed claim to (2) the value of the collateral securing the claim: The
allowed secured claim will be equal to the lesser of the allowed claim or the
value of the collateral.269 Pursuant to Code § 506(b)’s directive, only
holders of allowed oversecured claims (i.e., allowed claims secured by
collateral whose value exceeds the amount of the claim) are entitled to
augment the nominal amount of their allowed claims with unmatured
interest.270 This entitlement is an "unqualified" right that exists even in the
absence of an agreement between the creditor and the debtor for the
recovery of interest.271 Accordingly, the estate’s liability to holders of
oversecured claims will include liability for amounts relating to opportunity
cost, risk of default, and expected inflation.272
268. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (emphasis added). As a provision from Chapter 5 of the
Bankruptcy Code, § 506(b) is a provision of general applicability. Supra note 262. Code
§ 506(c) authorizes the trustee to surcharge the property securing an allowed secured claim
for certain expenses incurred in the preservation or disposition of such property, but only to
the extent of the benefit provided to the holder of the claim. Id. § 506(c).
269. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (providing rule for determining the secured status of an
allowed claim). In those instances where the amount of the allowed claim exceeds the value
of the collateral securing the claim, the creditor will have an allowed unsecured claim to the
extent that the allowed claim exceeds the collateral. Id. Accordingly, the Code bifurcates an
allowed undersecured claim into an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim.
Barash v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 68
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 356 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6312.
270. Of course, the claim can be augmented only to the extent that the allowed claim is
oversecured and only as the unmatured interest accrues. The rate at which post-petition
interest allowed under Code § 506(b) accrues has been observed to fall within the discretion
of the court. In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1058–60 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Milham,
141 F.3d 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Terry Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 1994).
In Chapter 13, recovery of unmatured interest pursuant to Code § 506(b) is limited to the
period of time beginning on the petition date and ending of the date of confirmation of the
debtor’s repayment plan. Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th
Cir. 2000).
271. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
272. In Chapter 13 cases, the Code arguably carves out an exception for the allowance
of interest under Code § 506(b) for holders of allowed claims secured by certain types of
purchase money security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Code § 1325(a) provides as
follows:
For purposes of [§ 1325(a)(5)], section 506 shall not apply to a claim
described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security interest
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2. Monthly Interest Payments to Single-Asset-Real-Estate
Creditors—Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii)

The second section satisfies only one of the baseline-deviation
attributes: It is not expressly framed as authorizing the allowance of
interest, but it is a generally applicable section. For a creditor of a debtor
with a single asset real estate (SARE)273 whose claim is secured by the real
estate, Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) authorizes a court to grant relief to the
creditor from the automatic stay274 if the debtor fails to commence monthly
payments (within a specified time period) to the creditor that "are in an
amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault contract rate of
interest on the value of the creditor’s interest in the real estate."275 While
the Code creates an entitlement for recovery of interest (i.e., amounts
relating to opportunity cost, risk of default, and expected inflation) by a
SARE creditor, it does not authorize such a creditor to augment the nominal
amount of its allowed claim.
3. Payment of Post-Petition Interest Accrued on
Chapter 7 Pre-Petition Claims—Code § 726(a)(5)
The third section satisfies neither of the baseline-deviation attributes—
that is, it neither is expressly framed as authorizing the allowance of interest
nor is it a generally applicable section. Code § 726(a)(5) specifies that, in a
Chapter 7 case, allowed unsecured claims (in addition to certain allowed
secured claims for nonpecuniary loss) that have been fully repaid from
estate property will also receive payment of interest at the legal rate from

securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within
the 910-day [period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal
use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of
value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
Id. ; see also, e.g., In re Leath, 389 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that
the language of Code § 1325(a)’s hanging paragraph is broad enough to preclude the
recovery of post-petition interest by oversecured creditors under Code § 506(b)).
273. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (defining SARE, in relevant part, as "real property
constituting a single property or project . . . which generates substantially all of the gross
income of a debtor . . . and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor
other than the business of operating the real property").
274. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay).
275. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii).
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the petition date,276 provided that estate funds remain for distribution.277
Like Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii), Code § 726(a)(5) creates an entitlement for
recovery of interest but does not authorize augmentation of the nominal
amount of the creditor’s allowed claim.278 Although Code § 726(a)(5) is a
specific section that, as a formal matter, applies only in Chapter 7 cases,279
the section is indirectly incorporated into cases under Chapters 11, 12, and
13 for purposes of ascertaining the amount of property that must be
distributed to allowed unsecured claims in order for a court to confirm a
debtor’s repayment plan.280 Specifically, if an allowed unsecured claim
would have received payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition
date in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, that amount must be taken into
account in calculating whether a debtor’s repayment plan makes a sufficient
distribution to the allowed unsecured claim.281
276. Id. § 726(a)(5).
277. See id. § 726(a), (b) (establishing order of distribution of estate property in
Chapter 7 cases to various classes of claimants and requiring distribution to be made within
each class on a pro rata basis); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 97 (1978), (stating that Code
§ 726(a)(5) interest "will be paid from the estate only if and to the extent that a surplus of
assets would otherwise remain for return to the debtor at the close of the case"), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5883.
278. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 678, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
("Properly understood, . . . interest under § 726(a)(5) is paid on an allowed claim . . . rather
than as an allowed claim.").
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) ("Subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of this title apply only
in a case under such chapter.").
280. Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 156.
281. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4) (creating confirmation
threshold focusing on the amount that would have been distributed in a hypothetical Chapter
7 liquidation); see also, e.g., Rice v. Dunbar (In re Rice), 357 B.R. 514, 518 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2006) (applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 12 case); Groundhog, Inc. v. San Joaquin
Estates, Inc. (In re San Joaquin Estates, Inc.), 64 B.R. 534, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)
(applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 11 case); In re Hoskins, 405 B.R. 576, 587–89
(Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2009) (applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 13 case). It has been
suggested that reference to Code § 726(a)(5) in applying the "best interest test" would be
inappropriate because the test envisions a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation that occurs
immediately on the effective date of the plan, thus precluding the accrual of interest. In re
Martin, 17 B.R. 924, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But this view fails to consider that Code
§ 726(a)(5) provides for the payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition date and
that the effective date of the plan can be subsequent to the petition date, thereby creating an
opportunity for the accrual of interest prior to the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Supra
note 36.
Interestingly, although certain allowed secured penalty claims for nonpecuniary loss are
entitled to receive the payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition date, if sufficient
funds exist, the Code does not take this into account in determining whether such claims
receive adequate distribution in Chapters 12 and 13. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4)–(5), (b). In
those instances where the debtor proposes to retain the property securing a holder’s claim
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Importantly, it should be noted that use of the term "legal rate" in Code
§ 726(a)(5) has been interpreted to mandate application of the postjudgment
interest rate for federal cases,282 which does not compensate for risk of
default.283 If this view is correct, then one witnesses an instance in which
Congress has expressed a preference for the recovery of interest at a riskfree rate. It should not be so hard to imagine, then, that Congress may
similarly have intended that the discount rate for present-value analysis be
risk free.
4. Payment of Post-Petition Interest Accrued on
Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 Pre-Petition Nondischargeable
Claims—Code §§ 1222(b)(11) and 1322(b)(10)
Like the third section, the fourth and fifth sections satisfy neither of
the baseline-deviation attributes—that is, they are neither expressly framed
as authorizing the allowance of interest nor are they generally applicable
sections. Code §§ 1222(b)(11) and 1322(b)(10) relate to provisions that
may, but need not be included, in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 repayment
plans.284 Each provision permits a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 plan,
respectively, to provide for the payment of post-petition interest that
accrues on debts that are not discharged upon completion of the plan, but
only if the plan provides to pay in full all allowed claims and the debtor has
sufficient disposable income to make the interest payments.285 Prior to
enactment of the Code, the Supreme Court had held that a debtor remains
and where the holder of the allowed secured claim has not accepted the debtor’s Chapter 12
or Chapter 13 plan, a court must ascertain whether the plan makes a sufficient distribution of
property to the holder of the allowed secured claim. In making the determination, the focus
is on the allowed amount of the secured claim rather than the amount that the holder of the
claim would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.
Id.
§§ 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). If the holder of the allowed secured penalty claim
for nonpecuniary loss is not oversecured, it is not entitled to augment its allowed claim with
amounts for unmatured interest. Supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. Thus, the
holder of the claim will not be compensated for the interest that it would have received in a
Chapter 7 case. If the holder of such a claim is undersecured, however, the holder has both
an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim. Supra note 269. Thus, the
holder would be compensated for the interest that it would have received on account of its
allowed unsecured claim in a Chapter 7 case.
282. Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2002).
283. Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436–37 (7th Cir.
1989).
284. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(11), 1322(b)(10).

285. Id.
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personally liable following a bankruptcy discharge for post-petition interest
on nondischargeable tax debt.286 Under the Code, courts have continued to
follow the Court’s pre-Code precedent, holding that interest on
nondischargeable debts continues to accrue during bankruptcy and that the
debtor will remain personally liable for such debt postbankruptcy.287
Accordingly, in order to maximize the fresh start provided by discharge, a
debtor will have an incentive to eliminate, to the extent possible, any
nondischargeable debt (including nondischargeable accrued interest) prior
to exiting bankruptcy.288
C. The Implications of the Nominal-Amount Baseline
With little rhyme or reason, the following picture emerges of the
special instances in which the Code deviates from the nominal-amount
baseline such that a creditor may recover unmatured interest:
•

Holders of allowed oversecured claims will generally be
allowed to augment the allowed amount of their claims to
include unmatured interest, subject to the following exceptions:
o

Holders of allowed oversecured claims secured by
certain purchase-money security interests will not be
entitled to such recovery in Chapter 13.289

o Holders of allowed oversecured penalty claims for
nonpecuniary loss in Chapter 7 cases will be allowed to
286. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 363 (1964).
287. See, e.g., Leeper v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Leeper), 49 F.3d
98, 105 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, in a Chapter 13 case, post-petition interest can continue
to accrue on a nondischargeable student loan); Fullmer v. United States (In re Fullmer), 962
F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Interest that accrues postpetition on a nondischargeable
prepetition tax debt survives bankruptcy as a personal liability."), abrogated on other
grounds by Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000); Burns v. United States (In
re Burns), 887 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e conclude that the post-petition
interest on a nondischargeable tax debt is nondischargeable."); Hanna v. United States (In re
Hanna), 872 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). It should be noted that this rule
contradicts the manner in which the Code’s legislative history generally characterizes the
accrual of post-petition interest—specifically, that such interest does not accrue. S. REP. NO.
95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309.
288. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 175, at 417–18 ("Any exception to discharge, of
course, encroaches upon the fresh start principle, and the threat looms that, when such
incursion is overextensive, the debtor will fail to reintegrate into society as an economically
productive individual." (footnote omitted)).
289. Supra note 272.
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augment their claims to include unmatured interest but
will be automatically subordinated to the claims of
holders of priority and nonpriority unsecured claims,
with the result that recovery of interest will occur only
if there are sufficient proceeds from property of the
estate to make distributions to the class of subordinated
penalty claims (and even then, the distribution could be
less than 100% of the claim).290
•

Holders of claims secured by a single asset real estate will not
be allowed to augment their allowed claims but will be allowed
to recover monthly interest payments if the debtor desires to
avoid having the court grant relief to the SARE creditor from
the automatic stay.

•

In Chapter 7 cases, holders of allowed unsecured claims and
holders of allowed secured penalty claims for nonpecuniary
loss will not be entitled to augment their claims to include
unmatured interest but will be entitled to receive payment of
interest at the legal rate from the petition date if there are
sufficient estate funds,291 which is highly unlikely.292

•

In cases under Chapters 11, 12, and 13, distributions to holders
of allowed unsecured claims must account for any payment of

290. In a Chapter 13 case, the Code has no such automatic subordination provision. As
such, the possibility arises that the debtor will have to make distributions on account of a
claim that otherwise may not have received a distribution in Chapter 7. This has the
potential to create a hurdle to plan confirmation if the debtor does not have sufficient income
to make the required distribution to the holder of an allowed nonpecuniary-loss penalty
claim that is secured.
291. Note that nothing about the Code’s automatic subordination provision in Chapter 7
for nonpecuniary-loss penalty claims prohibits a holder of such a claim that is oversecured
from availing itself of the entitlement to augment the allowed claim to include unmatured
interest. The subordination provision merely affects the order of distribution but does not
affect the allowance of the creditor’s claim. Cf. In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 559
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that the purpose of the doctrine of equitable subordination,
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006), is "to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on
the equities of the case, rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance"
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the possibility exists that, with a Chapter 7 estate where
sufficient funds exist for payment of interest at the legal rate, the holder of a nonpecuniaryloss penalty claim that is oversecured will recover Code § 726(a)(5) interest on Code
§ 506(b) interest—in effect, the recovery of compound interest. In other words, because
Code § 506(b) interest becomes part of the creditor’s allowed claim, it is essentially treated
as "principal" upon which Code § 726(a)(5) interest can be earned.
292. See U.S. TR. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHAPTER
7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000, at 7 (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/
private_trustee/library/chapter07/docs/assetcases/Publicat.pdf (noting that, "[h]istorically,
the vast majority (about 95 to 97 percent) of chapter 7 cases yield no assets").
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interest at the legal rate that such holders would have received
in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.
•

In cases under Chapters 12 and 13, holders of allowed claims
that are nondischargeable may receive interest payments if the
debtor’s repayment plan so provides.

Given the narrow set of circumstances in which the Code deviates
from the nominal-amount baseline, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
Code severely limits the recovery of unmatured interest—that is, amounts
for opportunity costs, risk of default, and expected inflation—by creditors.
It is equally important to note that the adequacy of the discount rate
proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan is generally a question of bankruptcy
law.293 When Congress has sought to defer to nonbankruptcy law in setting
the appropriate discount rate, it has expressly indicated this desire.294
Finally, the discounting process does not make any reference to the term
"interest."295
As evident from the outline set forth above, Congress has expressly
provided for the recovery of interest by creditors elsewhere throughout the
Code,296 including the payment of post-petition interest accrued on Chapter
13 pre-petition nondischargeable claims.297 Had Congress intended
present-value analysis to be tantamount to the recovery of garden-variety
interest (i.e., interest that compensates for opportunity cost, expected

293. See, e.g., Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs., Inc. v. Richards (In re
Richards), 106 B.R. 762, 766 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (stating that the determination of
present-value interest is determined by the Bankruptcy Code rather than by the contract
between the debtor and the creditor).
294. See 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006) ("If any provision of this title requires . . . the
payment of interest to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the allowed amount of
a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate determined under applicable nonbankruptcy
law." (emphasis added)).
295. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (noting that Code § 1325(a)(5)(B) "does not mention the term ‘discount rate’ or the
word ‘interest’"). Although this signpost did not go unnoticed by the plurality in Till, Justice
Stevens nonetheless framed the issue of present-value analysis in terms of interest payments.
See id. at 474 ("The challenge for bankruptcy courts reviewing such repayment schemes,
therefore, is to choose an interest rate sufficient to compensate the creditor for these
concerns.").
296. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the manner in which the Code provides for the
recovery of interest); see also Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 173 ("[I]t is apparent that
Congress described the obligation to pay plan interest under the reorganization chapters in
very different terms from the obligations to pay pendency interest under section 506(b) or
726(a)(5)." (footnote omitted)).
297. Supra Part IV.B.4.
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inflation, and risk of default), one would have expected Congress to have
explicitly said so. But it did not and has not.
Although considerations of administrative convenience may prompt us
to conceptualize the discounting process as nothing other than the payment
of garden-variety interest,298 doing so infuses the Code’s statutory
confirmation standards with a meaning that is not expressed in those
provisions but is expressed elsewhere in the Code—namely, the recovery of
interest (i.e., opportunity cost, expected inflation, and risk of default)
pursuant to those Code sections permitting deviation from the nominalamount baseline.
Accordingly, courts and commentators have
inappropriately assumed that the discount rate used for present-value
analysis ought to be similarly compensatory.
V. A Normative Appraisal of an Inflationary Discount Rate in
Consumer Bankruptcy
The remainder of this Article examines whether the doctrinal
prescription for the application of an inflationary discount rate in
bankruptcy is normatively desirable, ultimately concluding that it is.
Drawing upon the work of Thomas Jackson, Part V.A examines the issue of
whether failing to compensate creditors for opportunity cost and risk of
default undermines bankruptcy law’s goal to give effect to nonbankruptcy
entitlements, unless doing so interferes with the law’s attempt to overcome
the collective-action problem of self-interested creditors acting counter to
the interests of the creditors as a group.299 Part V.B then considers the
extent to which an inflationary discount rate comports with the fresh-start
principle in bankruptcy, which "captures the notion that substantive relief
should be afforded in the form of forgiveness of existing debt, with
relinquishment by the debtor of either existing nonexempt assets or a
portion of future income, in order to restore the debtor to economic

298. See Carbiener, supra note 144, at 45 ("Rather than discount the stream of
payments to be received by the discount rate, the same result can be achieved by adding
interest equal to the discount rate to scheduled principal payments."); Pawlowic, supra note
39, at 170 (noting that a present-value determination can be simplified if the debtor’s plan
proposes "the payment of a principal amount . . . plus interest at a rate equal to the rate that
otherwise would be used to discount the payments to present value").
299. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 28 ("Because the collective damage resulting
from adhering to a right may sometimes exceed any benefit, a bankruptcy statute sometimes
must replace nonbankruptcy rights with something else.").
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productivity."300 Finally, Part V.C identifies the manner in which presentvalue analysis implicates an administrative function that has the potential to
undermine the optimal institutional design of bankruptcy courts, pursuant to
which administrative and judicial functions are to be kept as separate as
possible. The Article concludes that, not only does an inflation rate
comport with generally held theory of bankruptcy law’s procedural and
substantive goals, it also optimizes the statutory design of the Bankruptcy
Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy courts.
A. Advancing Bankruptcy Law’s Procedural Goal
Thomas Jackson has argued that bankruptcy law ought to respect and
vindicate nonbankruptcy entitlements in order to avoid creating the very
problem that bankruptcy law seeks to overcome—that is, individuals acting
in self-interest counter to the group’s interest, such as one creditor shopping
for the bankruptcy forum merely to gain the advantage conferred by a
bankruptcy rule that does not recognize a competing creditor’s
nonbankruptcy entitlement.301 An exception to this rule exists, however, if
vindicating the nonbankruptcy entitlement interferes with bankruptcy law’s
collectivizing goal.302 In evaluating the normative desirability of an
inflationary discount rate in bankruptcy, one might therefore frame the
question in the following manner: If a creditor has a nonbankruptcy
entitlement to be compensated for risk of default and opportunity cost, does
bankruptcy procedural theory suggest that the entitlement should be
vindicated or give way? Arguably, sound bankruptcy policy dictates a
disregard for a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be compensated for both.
First, in considering why a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be
compensated for default risk ought not to be vindicated, one should
consider the issue from the perspective of both voluntary and involuntary
300. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 175, at 414; see also, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 241, at
4 (noting that "[t]he policy relating to discharge and notions of a fresh start . . . addresses the
question of whether limits should be established on what creditors can get from their
debtor"); William O. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies—State vs. Federal Control, 42
YALE L.J. 591, 592–93 (1933) ("The bankruptcy power in general entails a determination of
legislative policy on two problems[.] . . . The second problem entails primarily a
determination of the debts from which a debtor may be discharged, the conditions if any for
a discharge, and the grounds upon which it may be refused.").
301. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 20–67 (examining the determination of liabilities
in bankruptcy in relation to the role of bankruptcy law).
302. Supra note 299.
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creditors. From the perspective of a voluntary creditor, that creditor’s
nonbankruptcy right to be compensated for default risk will generally
terminate once the borrowing debtor defaults.
Such a creditor will
generally extend credit to many borrowers. Some of those borrowers will
default and others will not. If the creditor has appropriately priced the cost
of credit, it will be able to offset the losses from defaulting borrowers with
the gains from nondefaulting borrowers.303 Extending in bankruptcy a
voluntary creditor’s nonbankruptcy right that has terminated would have
the effect of impermissibly overvaluing the right relative to those of
competing claimants—that is, by allowing the recovery of profit from a
debtor who has defaulted, which loss should be offset by the creditor’s
nondefaulting borrowers304—and would thus compromise the collectivizing
goal of the bankruptcy process.305
From the perspective of an involuntary creditor, there is the initial
question of whether that creditor has a nonbankruptcy entitlement to
compensation for default risk. For example, the federal postjudgment rate
is a risk-free rate.306 For those instances where applicable nonbankruptcy
law would entitle an involuntary creditor to recover for default risk,307 it
303. See In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that,
when a lending institution calculates a risk factor, "[t]hat calculation can simply be made by
determining the expected rate of default and then factoring an enhanced interest rate charge
so that the cost or risk of defaulting loans will be evenly spread among other loans"),
abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d
211 (5th Cir. 1997).
304. See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("These
lenders understand that a significant number of their borrowers . . . may, in fact, end up in
bankruptcy. Yet, they continue to make high-risk loans because the money they receive
from non-defaulting borrowers is enough to offset that risk; they would not remain in
business otherwise."), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465
(2004); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 262 (noting that, if a
creditor were entitled to recover present-value interest at the nondefault contract rate, "[s]uch
an interest rate arguably includes a calculation for profit, potentially giving the creditor more
than it would have received had the property been foreclosed").
305. Cf. In re Scott, 248 B.R. 786, 793 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[A]pplying a rate of
interest that fully reflects risk of nonpayment—like the contract rate in the present case—to
a secured claim amount that already includes substantial ‘risk protection’ results in a
windfall for the secured creditor, to the detriment of unsecured creditors.").
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006) (providing that postjudgment interest rate "shall be
calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1year constant maturity Treasury yield").
307. See, e.g., Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436
(7th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e suggest that district judges use the prime rate for fixing prejudgment
interest where there is no statutory interest rate. That is a readily ascertainable figure which
provides a reasonable . . . estimate for the interest rate necessary to compensate plaintiffs . . .
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seems reasonable to conclude that the majority of such creditors will be
general unsecured creditors. Because an individual debtor’s risk of default
under a Chapter 13 repayment plan will likely be uniform vis-à-vis all
members within this class of claimants for a given case, the effect of
vindicating the nonbankruptcy entitlement to default-risk compensation will
be to increase the nominal amount of each creditor’s claim. But because
the income available for distribution is limited, there will be no increase in
the creditor’s pro-rata distribution. Accordingly, vindicating the right
increases administrative costs without any real benefit, thus undermining
the goal of maximizing a debtor’s estate for the benefit of all creditors. As
such, the nonbankruptcy entitlement ought to give way.
Second, in considering why a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be
compensated for opportunity cost ought not to be vindicated, the concern
over administrative costs is equally present. Each creditor’s opportunity
cost will differ from that of other creditors in a given bankruptcy case. As
such, opportunity cost will have to be calculated individually for each
creditor. It is not difficult to imagine that, in some instances, the calculus
will lead to litigation. The initial calculus and any subsequent litigation
related thereto will produce administrative costs that could very well
become intractable.308 Once again, these costs will have the effect of
undermining bankruptcy law’s procedural goal of maximizing a debtor’s
estate for the benefit of all creditors. To avoid this result, a nonbankruptcy
entitlement to be compensated for opportunity cost ought not to be
vindicated in bankruptcy.309
for the risk of default.").
308. See Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002)
("Calculating the appropriate rate and amount of interest to be paid to a myriad of investors
has the potential to overwhelm what could otherwise be a relatively simple process pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5)."); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105
F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) ("This [‘cost of funds’] approach, however, is difficult for
bankruptcy courts to apply efficiently and inexpensively. Because individual creditors
borrow funds at different rates, bankruptcy courts would have to determine a creditor’s cost
of funds on a case-by-case basis."), abrogated by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953 (1997).
309. One might go a step further and ask whether bankruptcy law ought to compensate
creditors for expected inflation. In any given case, the inflation rate ought to be the same for
all creditors. Thus, compensating creditors for expected inflation will increase the nominal
amount of their claims. Because the amount of estate property available for distribution is
fixed, however, a creditor’s pro-rata distribution will not be increased. Thus, there will be
administrative costs with little benefit gained. This may suggest that bankruptcy law ought
not to provide for discounting in the first instance. While this may sound unorthodox, it may
be that the common-pool problem that bankruptcy law seeks to overcome makes bankruptcy
a unique area of law requiring an unconventional approach. Cf. Revesz, supra note 240, at
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B. Advancing Bankruptcy Law’s Substantive Goal

One of the animating goals of bankruptcy law is to restore financially
distressed debtors to economic productivity by forgiving their past debts.
The litigation process in bankruptcy, depending on how it is structured,
may potentially interfere with a debtor’s fresh start.310 If discounting in
bankruptcy is structured so as to compensate a creditor for default risk and
opportunity cost, any dispute over the appropriate rate will involve a
calculation of these amounts. This information is more readily available to
and more easily processed by commercially sophisticated creditors, who are
repeat players in the system, rather than consumer debtors, who tend to be
one-shot players. The informational asymmetry that results is one likely to
favor creditors.311 If, on the other hand, discounting in bankruptcy is
structured solely to account for inflation, the playing field would be leveled
insofar as the information regarding the inflation rate is readily
ascertainable and processed by both parties. An inflation-rate regime thus
reduces search costs for debtors, thereby opening access to Chapter 13
rehabilitation. Accordingly, the Article concludes that an inflation rate for
present-value analysis enhances the prospects of debtor rehabilitation by
eliminating undue advantages from informational asymmetries that
987–1016 (examining environmental regulation, cost-benefit analysis, and the discounting of
human lives; and arguing that, in the case of harms to future generations, discounting is
ethically unjustified and thus should not be part of the regulatory process).
As a functional matter, empirical evidence suggests that the focus in bankruptcy ought
to be on the valuation of assets, rather than the discounting of payments. In a 2007 study,
Timothy Fisher and Jocelyn Martel examined the sensitivity of the best-interests test to
various assumptions about (1) discount rates, (2) probability of successful reorganization,
(3) time required to liquidate assets, and (4) the liquidation value of assets. Fisher & Martel,
supra note 151, at 498. The study looked at data on 180 firms that filed for reorganization
under the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act between 1992 and 1996, and they
carried out best-interests tests on the data by varying the values for the aforementioned
variables. They ultimately found that the best-interests test is sensitive only to assumptions
about liquidation value; the test, however, is not sensitive to discount rates, the probability of
successful reorganization, and the time required for liquidation. Fisher & Martel, supra note
151. The findings from the study thus suggest that it is the valuation threshold that matters
most. If valuation drives recovery in bankruptcy, rather than a discount rate, bankruptcy law
ought to focus on the former rather than the latter. Doing so will eliminate a layer of
administrative costs and have the positive effect of maximizing returns to creditors.
310. See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, supra note 252, at 232 (stating that empirical evidence
"suggests that undue hardship discharge litigation improperly curtails access to justice for
student-loan debtors who legitimately need relief from their financial distress").
311. Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Till recognizes the informational asymmetry
inherent in a present-value-analysis dispute between a creditor and an individual debtor. Till
v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484–85 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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generally favor creditors and by reducing search costs for consumer
debtors.312 As such, the doctrinal prescription suggested in this Article
comports with generally held notions of what bankruptcy law ought to do
substantively.
C. Optimizing Statutory and Institutional Design
Nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress violates the constitutional
principle of separation of powers when it delegates excessive authority to
agencies.313 The delegation is not excessive, however, if Congress supplies
an "intelligible principle" that guides and constrains the delegated
authority.314 In other words, Congress must make the foundational
decisions about statutory policy. Margaret Lemos has persuasively argued
that Congress delegates to courts in the same fashion as it does to
administrative agencies and that, as such, those delegations ought to be
examined to see whether they run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.315
Moreover, even if the delegation is permissible, the question arises as to
who is the more appropriate delegate—that is, a court or an agency.316 In
evaluating the normative desirability of an inflation rate for discounting in
consumer bankruptcy, one might therefore examine Congress’s decision to
delegate (a question of statutory design) as well as Congress’s choice of
delegate (a question of institutional characteristics).

312. In the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Till, Judge Rovner’s dissenting opinion noted
that an overcompensatory discount rate is "inconsistent with the fresh start that Chapter 13
was intended to provide to debtors." In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner,
J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
313. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("In a delegation
challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power
to the agency.").
314. Id.
315. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 408 (2008) ("Just as agencies
exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad delegations of power,
so too do courts. And, to the extent that lawmaking by agencies triggers constitutional
anxieties about the proper allocation of power . . . , so too should delegated lawmaking by
courts." (footnote omitted)); see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty
Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 665 (2004) (developing the "Penalty Default
Canon [which] requires courts to declare responsibility-shifting statutory provisions
unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority").
316. See Lemos, supra note 315, at 469–75 (analyzing the positive and negative effects
of courts serving as delegates).
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First, consider the question of statutory design. An open-ended
instruction by Congress to the courts without more, as exists under the
current arrangement, may constitute an impermissible delegation. The
positive theory provided in Part III of this Article is one that may insulate
the current statutory design from such an attack. One might argue that the
guideposts throughout the Code provide the requisite "intelligible principle"
that would make the delegation nonexcessive.
But even if a nondelegation challenge to the current arrangement is
unlikely, open-ended statutory design in the discounting context raises
implementation concerns as a result of anchoring effects. Research shows
that, when individuals make estimates, they will often rely on an initial
value to anchor their final estimate.317 An anchor can influence judgment,
even if the anchor does not convey useful information.318 In an
experimental study in 2004 involving 113 bankruptcy judges (after the
Supreme Court had decided Till), the judges were asked to set the discount
rate for cramdown payments to a secured creditor in a hypothetical Chapter
13 proceeding.319 Judges were instructed to follow the Till plurality’s
"prime-plus" approach.320 The control group was not told the contract
interest rate, which was higher than the prime rate, whereas the
experimental group was told the contract rate.321 At the mean, the
experimental group set a statistically significantly higher discount rate than
the control group.322
As a matter of statutory design, asking courts to account solely for
expected inflation provides a prophylactic approach toward overcoming
anchoring effects. Recall that the doctrinal prescription set forth in this
Article calls for a downward departure from the Treasury-note rate.323
Assuming that knowledge of a contract rate has an anchoring effect, it will
be to minimize the downward departure. Given that the Treasury-note rate
is lower than the prime rate, the detrimental effect of anchoring will be
mitigated.

317. Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2006).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1234.
320. Id. at 1234–35.
321. Id. at 1235.
322. Id. For further discussion regarding anchoring effects in the context of Till, see
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 113.
323. Supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text.
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Second, consider the question of institutional design. In order to get
better administrability of present-value analysis in consumer bankruptcy,
we ought to use a discount rate that solely accounts for expected inflation—
particularly in light of the fact that, under the current bankruptcy system,
there exists no administrative agency with rulemaking or adjudicatory
authority. Anything beyond an inflationary discount rate may have the
effect of making the bankruptcy court a bad delegate for administering the
Code’s present-value provision. If discounting in bankruptcy is required to
account for risk of default and opportunity cost, in addition to expected
inflation, the discount-rate calculus becomes an overly burdensome
nonforensic determination—that is, a determination that involves prediction
about the future course of events in administration of the bankruptcy case,
which in turn requires the court to evaluate risks and balance competing
risk-reward preferences among case participants.324 A court, however, is
not well equipped to make such a determination because (1) the court does
not have an independent investigatory arm to conduct research about future
risk, (2) the adversary system chills collaborative exchange between parties
in solving a forward-looking problem, and (3) the indeterminacy of the
future makes it difficult to establish an effective legal standard.325
Furthermore, estimating default risk and opportunity cost increases the
complexity and cost of acquiring information that will accurately predict
present value. This will interfere with a court’s ability to devote its
resources to resolving disputed forensic matters, which are at the core of the
judicial function.326 Thus, concerns over institutional design provide
normative support for a discount rate that solely accounts for expected
inflation.327

324. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV.
963, 972 (1993).
325. Id. at 981–83.
326. See id. at 978 ("[A]uthoritative decisions about disputed forensic matters in
bankruptcy cases should be made in the judicial system."). For further discussion regarding
the manner in which the statutory design of the Bankruptcy Code erodes the judicial
function, see Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 488–93 (2007).
327. Cf. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 328 ("[T]here is little to be said for any approach
that places large information burdens on the bankruptcy court. . . . The system really is not
designed to adjudicate the facts of each individual debtor."); Schwartz, supra note 49, at 115
n.18 (stating that Till "needlessly increase[s] the administrative costs of consumer
bankruptcy . . . by increasing the number of interest rate hearings").
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VI. Conclusion

This Article has attempted to bring some order to the chaos that has
characterized the law’s approach to present-value analysis in consumer
bankruptcy. It has argued that, as a positive matter, the Bankruptcy Code
compels application of an inflation rate when discounting future payments
to present value. Adherence to this prescription will not only make the
doctrine more sound, it will also further bankruptcy law’s procedural and
substantive goals and will optimize the statutory design of the Bankruptcy
Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy courts.

